Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Bulletin of Economic Research Pub Date : 2023-01-06 DOI:10.1111/boer.12384

María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena, Matteo Triossi

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case, the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both nonempty. In addition, we show that, if we allow agents to block matchings without changing their mate, the results do not longer hold.

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关于外部性较弱的婚姻市场的注记

我们认为婚姻市场具有外部性。我们关注的是弱外部性，即每个代理人主要关心其合作伙伴的市场。我们形式化并证明了弱外部性在婚姻市场中并不那么显著的说法：在这种情况下，ω-核心和α-核心重合，并且都是非空的。此外，我们还表明，如果我们允许特工在不改变配偶的情况下阻止匹配，结果将不再成立。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Bulletin of Economic Research ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Bulletin of Economic Research is an international journal publishing articles across the entire field of economics, econometrics and economic history. The Bulletin contains original theoretical, applied and empirical work which makes a substantial contribution to the subject and is of broad interest to economists. We welcome submissions in all fields and, with the Bulletin expanding in new areas, we particularly encourage submissions in the fields of experimental economics, financial econometrics and health economics. In addition to full-length articles the Bulletin publishes refereed shorter articles, notes and comments; authoritative survey articles in all areas of economics and special themed issues.