Employee bonding and turnover efficiency

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Jonathan R. Peterson
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study explores how bonding contracts improve employee attraction and retention. These bonds are payment schemes tied to employment duration, such as the vesting of pensions and stock options. This study presents an employee turnover model in which only the worker knows their taste for their current job. This taste gives the current employer monopsonistic power, resulting in deadweight loss from excessive turnover. Bonding contracts serve as a commitment device for future wages and eliminate such deadweight loss, but only when the roles of bondholders and wage setters are separate. Firms that do this are more competitive to new hires. This model offers several empirical findings regarding a variety of common bonding practices.

员工关系和离职效率
本研究探讨了担保合同如何提高员工的吸引力和忠诚度。这些债券是与就业期限挂钩的支付计划,例如养老金和股票期权的归属。这项研究提出了一个员工流动模型,其中只有员工知道他们对当前工作的品味。这种品味赋予了当前雇主独大的权力,导致了过度流动带来的无谓损失。债券合同是未来工资的承诺工具,可以消除这种无谓的损失,但前提是债券持有人和工资制定者的角色是分开的。这样做的公司对新员工更有竞争力。该模型提供了一些关于各种常见粘合实践的经验发现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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