Issues in Australian Foreign Policy July to December 2022

Abstract

The second half of 2022 saw the newly elected Australian Labor Party take their new brand of foreign policy on the road. After a turbulent first half of the year where foreign policy took an unusually large focus of the 2022 election campaign, in July to December the Albanese government was able to settle into government and carve out their foreign policy agenda. As James Blackwell highlighted in his assessment of the January to June 2022 period, “we do indeed live in interesting times”.1 The election saw more Australians talking about foreign policy, which enabled the government to “go strong” on foreign policy. Just days after being elected, Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong flew to Japan for the annual Quad Leaders' Meeting in Tokyo. Collectively, Albanese, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and Wong travelled to 32 states in 2022, Wong alone visiting 24. Throughout 2022 this set the pace for an Albanese government that engaged regularly with international peers, carving out a more internationalist foreign policy that is typical of Labor governments.

In a similar way to the collective sigh of relief felt when Biden was elected,2 the foreign policy community was looking forward to an Albanese government with a more predictable and sensible foreign policy, where public rhetoric and “wolf warriors” did not typify the foreign policy agenda. A moment of calm, ironically despite the regular international visits, was setting over Australian foreign policy.

This foreign policy review will seek to unpack the beginnings of the Albanese and Wong approach to overseas affairs, looking at their typically-Labor regional focus, and how the new government is seeking to separate its foreign policy brand from previous governments. It will also delve into some of the key issues and challenges for the new government, including living up to expectations on climate change and engaging with more traditional allies.

Traditional Labor foreign policy has been described as being more internationalist, characterised by enhanced multilateralism, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. While the Liberal party had its own foreign policy agenda, which included the 'Pacific Step Up', enhancing relations with the Quad, and going hard on China, since the election of the new Albanese Government we have seen Australia become a ‘global citizen’ once more.

In a 2016 article Tanya Plibersek outlined the ‘Labor approach’ to Australian foreign policy, suggesting that “good international citizenship is a critical driver to achieving a secure and prosperous Australia”, leaning on former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans' conception of “good international citizenship”.3 Plibersek went on to highlight Labor multilateralism with Foreign Minister H.V. “Doc” Evatt at the United Nations 1945 San Francisco conference and Labor's tradition in Asia and on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Interestingly for 2022 and noting the AUKUS agreement, Plibersek highlighted that Australia will “not prosper in the Asian century by retreating into the Anglosphere”.4 So far, the Albanese government has adequately managed juggling increased engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, while bolstering Australian defence capabilities through the AUKUS agreement. But the government risks placing too much emphasis on the US and the UK, to the detriment of Indo-Pacific partners. The beginning of 2023 will be the real test of this challenge, as the government announces AUKUS Pillar I and releases the defence strategic review.

A scroll on Albanese's Twitter and Instagram will reveal a confident leader who is comfortable in the spotlight, in front of the camera and with the community. His signature navy suit, dark glasses, and RM Williams boots (a staple of most Australian leaders) portrays an everyday man, in contrast to Morrison, whose Instagram features awkward photos and Liberal party quotes. This modern form of soft power is marketed towards voters whose decision-making is based on algorithms and click bait. Social media personal branding is one of the two ways that Albanese's admiration of Biden is evident, the second being centring climate change as a key pillar of domestic and foreign policy. ‘Brand Albo’ seems to be in stark contrast to ‘Brand Morrison’, where Morrison and his team put forth a public persona of the “daggy dad”, as Blair Williams has described.5 Albanese's foreign policy branding was seen early in his government's term, with a visit from New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern turning into a record swap.6

Morrison did not seem as comfortable in front of the camera as Albanese, at a time when the personal branding of leaders became more prominent. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Volodymr Zelensky “weaponize[d] his wardrobe”, deploying a closet of khaki slacks and jumpers.7 Emmanuel Macron went viral for his post-phone call photoshoots.8 And in a highlight of personal political branding for 2022, US president Joe Biden gifted Pacific leaders at the US-Pacific Summit a pair of his iconic Ray Ban Aviator sunglasses, so that leaders could “quite literally, see things through Biden's lens”.9 Summit photos and gift bags have become key imagery for host countries, and with Australia hosting the Quad Leaders Meeting in 2023, what the Albanese government does with the Quad leaders will signify how he seeks his government to be perceived.

For Wong, her foreign policy style has been characterised by her “listening” approach, particularly with Pacific nations.10 The importance of the first Asian and queer woman as Australia's foreign minister must not go unnoticed. This has seen her leadership celebrated by neighbours across Asia, who are now seeing a different representation of Australia's population demographics. This has enabled Wong to deploy charm and skilled diplomacy. Most of Wong's trips as Foreign Minister have been to Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and in her key speech of the second half of the year, delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore, she spoke on a “shared future” for Australia and Southeast Asia.11 Pointedly, Wong highlighted that “Australia must find its security in Asia, not from Asia”.12

Richard Marles has a much more traditional personal branding; the role of Defence Minister not lending itself to photo opportunities and Instagram captions. To broaden his appeal, Marles has written op-eds on his visits to Germany, the UK and France.13 To assess Marles' foreign policy style, this review will look at his speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington at the beginning of July. Like most leaders visiting the US, Marles reflected on Australia and the US fighting alongside one another in World War II.14 He emphasised that under his leadership Defence will have a “rigorous focus on improving alliance cooperation”.15 Marles' leadership in Defence and facilitating the AUKUS agreement saw him focus on the US in particular during the second half of 2022, in contrast to Wong's focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

On development, Wong announced at her United Nations General Assembly speech that Australia will be working on a new development policy. Minister for International Development & the Pacific and Minister for Defence Industry, Pat Conroy, further elaborated on this in a key speech to the Australian Council for International Development. Conroy pointed to the government's intention to strengthen partnerships with governments so they can “sustain their own development”, “enhance resilience to external pressure and shocks”, “connecting partners with Australia and regional architecture” and finally “generating collective action on global challenges that impact our region”.16 The new government hopes to create a more ambitious and more coordinated development policy. In the six-month period, the government increased aid to Pakistan to support with floods, provided drought assistance for Tuvalu and Kiribati, and gave humanitarian support to Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Horn of Africa, and Yemen.17

One of the unique features of the Albanese-Wong foreign policy agenda is the appointment of an Assistant Foreign Minister, Tim Watts, Member for the multicultural seat of Gellibrand in Melbourne's western suburbs. Before his appointment, Watts was Assistant Shadow Minister for Communications and Cybersecurity, demonstrating a clear interest in cyber policy throughout his time in parliament. He has released two books, the first co-authored with now Home Affairs Minister Clare O'Neil, Two Futures: Australia at a Critical Moment. The second book, The Gold Century: Australia's Changing Identity, looks at Australia's multiculturalism with a focus on Asia. Since his election in 2013 Watts has become a rising star in Australia's foreign and digital policy spaces. His role as Assistant Minister has seen him travel throughout the region, notably to Africa, South America and throughout the Indian Ocean – the often-forgotten area of the Indo-Pacific. Watts' role enables Australia to have a seat at the table, where the Foreign Minister might otherwise be busy or on other duties. Having an Assistant Foreign Minister increases Australia's global reach.

Over the six-month period, the Albanese government demonstrated its commitment to increasing representation of First Nations Australians. Alongside Albanese's commitment to holding a referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament, the government has also adopted a First Nations Foreign Policy. Blackwell discussed the potential and opportunities of a First Nations Foreign Policy in his January to June Foreign Policy Review, and in the second half of the year more information on what it would look like emerged.18 In announcing the opening of Expression of Interest applications for the Ambassador for First Nations People, Wong noted that the Ambassador “will lead work to embed Indigenous perspectives, experiences and interests into our foreign policy, including to help grow First Nations' trade and investment”.19 Globally the Ambassador will engage with First Nations' rights and increase “cooperation” in the Indo-Pacific.20

As Labor settled into government, the most prominent postings included Kevin Rudd as the next Ambassador to the United States and Stephen Smith as High Commissioner to the UK. Smith, co-lead of the Defence Strategic Review, will be able to work closely with the UK on the implementation of AUKUS. The appointment of Rudd to Washington, however, has been met with criticism. A controversial figure in Australian and international politics, his interest in China has seen him earn a doctorate for a thesis on Xi Jinping's thought and his last job before taking up the Ambassadorship was the CEO of the Asia Society, based in New York. Rudd's focus on Asia, not the US, could either be a challenge or a strength for the government. His skills on China will enable him to keep Australia's regional interests in mind, not just bilateral, and no doubt the connections he has forged with the foreign policy community in Washington and globally, as both Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, will be useful. Importantly for 2023, Rudd has critiqued AUKUS for leaving Australia “strategically naked for 20 years” during the wait for the submarines.21 There has been much debate on the appointment of career diplomats versus political diplomat appointments, with the UK and US often being home to political appointees.22

The Albanese government strengthened ties with Europe to help with efforts to support Ukraine's fight against Russia. The government kicked off the six-month period in Europe, with Albanese travelling to Madrid for the NATO Leaders Summit as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. After visiting Spain and re-emphasising Australia's commitment to supporting Ukraine, Albanese then travelled to Paris.23 In France, he sought to improve bilateral relations acknowledging that France is “not only a great European power, but also an Indo-Pacific and world power”.24 Strengthening relations with France after the AUKUS submarine deal blunder has been important to Albanese's foreign policy, particularly in regard to France's cooperation in the Pacific to curtail increased engagement from China. Albanese's trip to Europe ended in Ukraine, visiting Kyiv to meet with Zelensky. This was alongside further announcements of Australian support to Ukraine over 2022, including military and humanitarian financial assistance and sanctions on Russia.25 The Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles have been particularly requested by the Ukrainian government, with Australia providing a total of ninety.26 Wong also announced Magnitsky-style sanctions due to “Russian human rights violations and invasion of Ukraine”.27

In July, the government co-hosted the Sydney Energy Forum with the International Energy Agency. Ministers from across the Indo-Pacific including the US, India, Indonesia, and Samoa attended the forum alongside business and global climate leaders.28 In his speech to the Forum, Albanese highlighted the impact of the war in Ukraine on energy markets globally.29 He called out the previous government for having “no coherent energy policy for a decade”.30 In contrast, Albanese mentioned a jobs-focused energy initiative that will train new workers through the New Energy Apprenticeships and New Energy Skills programs, creating an estimated 604,000 new jobs.31 Domestically, Albanese's climate policy is jobs and skills focused. Broadening out to the region, Albanese gave a green light to the Sun Cable Australia-Asia PowerLink project, the Asia Renewable Energy Hub and deepening energy engagement with Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

COP27 took place in Cairo, with Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy, representing Australia. What should have been Australia's big return to COP negotiations was a letdown as the conference was met with criticism for holding the 2022 meeting in Egypt in an “elite resort town” where attendees “only saw a carefully calibrated view of the country”.32 This contrasted with the UK's presidency of COP26 in Scotland where it ran a strong public diplomacy campaign. Alongside struggling negotiations and only small progress made on climate justice, COP27 was decried as the “worst organised COP in 30 years”.33 This was despite the establishment of a ‘Loss and Damage Fund’ where smaller countries will have access to support for climate-related natural disasters including floods, droughts, and rising seas.34 The parameters of the fund are still being negotiated, but its establishment is a historic win for smaller nations who have been asking for ongoing financial support from rich nations for the damages caused by climate change, led by the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS) since 2013.35 For the Pacific in particular, the AOSIS has been a key platform for their international climate diplomacy.36 The funds could be used towards providing emergency humanitarian relief, infrastructure support after environmental disasters, and relocation from rising sea levels.37 The Australian Government, and many developed states, have been hesitant to accept the creation of ‘loss and damage’ funds. However, the Labor government will have to listen to Pacific Islands demands if it wants their support to co-host COP31 in 2026. At the Australian Pavilion at COP27, Pacific leaders called upon Australia to strengthen its loss and damage commitment. However, despite this and an attempt to enhance climate policy alongside relations with Pacific states, Australia remained hesitant to do so. As negotiations continue over the Fund, COP28 in Dubai will need to strengthen the Loss and Damage Fund. If Australia wants to co-host a COP31 in 2026 with the Pacific, it will need to support Pacific calls for an enhanced commitment in this space.

Despite Bowen calling upon the World Bank and other development banks to assist in financial support for climate change, there was no mention of Australia's contributions to the Loss and Damage Fund.38 With a Pacific-focused speech, Bowen mentioned the commitment to $900 million to support the Pacific on climate change. Australia also announced it was joining a range of initiatives on renewable energies, including the Global Methane Pledge, Green Shipping Challenge, and the Global Mangrove Alliance.39 In November Kristen Tilley was announced as the Ambassador for Climate Change, bringing to the role over ten years' experience on domestic and international climate change programs.40 A few weeks after COP27 in December, Bowen released Australia's first Annual Climate Change Statement, announcing that Australia has increased its emission cuts target by 2030 to 43 per cent from 30 per cent, although in some areas such as transport and agriculture, emissions will rise. It notes that the government's 43 per cent emissions cut by 2030 is “ambitious but achievable”.41 However, many argue that a 43 per cent target is not enough. The Climate Council recommends that the Albanese government should aim higher for a 75 per cent emissions cut by 2030 in order to reach the Paris Agreement target of limiting global warming to below two degrees Celsius.42 To reach the 2030 target, climate experts are calling on the Government to further reduce emissions from coal and gas.43 Yet the government has come under fire for approving ten new oil and gas ocean exploration sites.44 Overall, despite changes to the climate legislation, Australia will need to work hard and fast to reduce emissions.

On July 8, former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe was assassinated on the campaign trail for the Liberal Democratic Party.45 A shock to Japan and the international community, Abe's legacy has been remembered as an architect of the Indo-Pacific. Albanese reflected that Abe was “one of Australia's closest friends on the world stage”, under his leadership Australia-Japan relations were strengthened with the 2014 Special Strategic Partnership.46 Outside the bilateral relationship, Abe was among the early users of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, helping to conceptualise the Quad and the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’.47 Abe's mission to make Japan a key player in the region was successful. However, in Japan he left behind a complicated legacy. A conservative leader, his ‘Abeconomics’ saw structural reforms which strengthened the Japanese economy, however inflation and low wage growth impacted standards of living for everyday Japanese people.48 His government was met with internal scandals,49 and relations with South Korea and China worsened.50 In the broader foreign policy community Abe will be remembered as a strong diplomatic force. Australia's relations with Japan also strengthened during this time, with Albanese hosting his Japanese counterpart in Fumio Kishida in Perth in September. The meeting signified increased relations on security issues, clean energy, and regional cooperation.51 In Perth, the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was signed, an important moment for enhanced security engagement.52

In August, as China launched eleven ballistic missiles into waters near Taiwan's coastline, it was unclear how relations with China would progress with the new government.53 Wong released a statement saying that the “exercises are disproportionate and destabilising” raising concerns for military escalation and miscalculation.54 The launches happened whilst many Indo-Pacific leaders were in Cambodia for the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. The same day as the launches, foreign ministers from Australia, Japan and the US met on the sidelines of the meeting for a strategic dialogue.55 Days after, in Bali on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Wong met with her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. This was the first meeting between Australian and Chinese ministers in three years.56 During the meeting Wong raised concerns about human rights, trade sanctions and the detaining of two Australian citizens, Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun.57 While the meeting produced nothing more than the beginning of a defrosting of relations and a re-opening of diplomatic dialogue, it paved the way for future discussions with China. Wong's meeting in August with Wang led to a meeting between Albanese and Xi on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in November, which was hailed as the end of the “diplomatic deep freeze” in Australia-China relations.58 November proved to be momentous for Australia-China relations, as both countries celebrated the 50^th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. This was, however, the first time Chinese and Australian leaders had met in six years. At the meeting, Albanese emphasized that while the Australia-China relationship was “important”, “Australia won't resile from our interests or our values”.59 Hailed by many as “historic”, this was a welcome shift in Australia's foreign policy.60 Putting the pressure on bilateral relations during the defrosting, August also saw the United Nations Human Rights Office complete their assessment of human rights in Xinjiang. The report found that China was responsible for “serious human rights violations”, noting that “allegations of patterns of torture, or ill-treatment… are credible, as are allegations of individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence”.61 Australia released a statement on the UN report, emphasising that the government is “deeply concerned”, calling on China to grant “meaningful and unfettered access to Xinjiang for United Nations experts”.62 In Beijing, Wong raised concerns about human rights in Xinjiang with Wang.63 Towards the end of the year, anti-Government protesters swept across China, protesting the zero-COVID policy.64

Much of the government's focus over the six months was on Indonesia, including strengthening the biosecurity partnership with that country,65 the arrival of foot and mouth vaccines in response to the disease outbreak,66 and the 20^th anniversary of the Bali bombings.67 Indonesia was also the host of the 2022 G20 meetings.68 Indonesia faced pressure from predominantly Western states over Russia's G20 invitation. Although Russian president Vladimir Putin ultimately did not attend the Summit, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov participated. Despite attempts by Indonesia to keep discussion of the war in Ukraine to a minimum, negotiations were made on the language around the invasion in the drafting of the declaration.69 While in Bali, Wong also participated in the MIKTA Foreign Ministers meeting with Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey. At the meeting, the middle powers discussed shared values and challenges on economic relations, democracy, and international cooperation.70 December also saw the introduction of Indonesia's Criminal Code, which limits freedom of speech, press and religious freedoms and cracks down on the rights of women and LGBTQIA+ minorities under “morality provisions”.71 For Australians however, concern has focused on Indonesia's banning of sex outside of marriage, coined the “Bali Bonk Ban”.72

In the Pacific, Albanese, Marles, Wong, and Conroy all made regular visits across the region. Highlights included a trip to Fiji for the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting, Marles meeting the new President of Nauru, Russ Kun, the signing of a security agreement with Vanuatu and Canberra visits from delegations from the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.73 Australia and Timor-Leste also signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement.74

The 2022 Myanmar military junta continued, with the execution of pro-democracy activists,75 as well as Australian humanitarian support to Myanmar.76 Australian economist and academic Sean Turnell, who was detained there in February 2021, was sentenced in a September 2022 trial to three years' prison. However, two months later he was released and returned to Australia.77 Protests also erupted in Iran after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died in the custody of Iran's morality police, arrested for allegedly not wearing a hijab to government standards. In an attempt to end the protests, the Iranian government has cracked down on protesters, including mass arrests and drones and missiles.78 In response to the protests, Australia has imposed Magnitsky-style sanctions on Iran, raised concerns for Australians in Iran, and warned Iran about foreign interference.79

The six-month period proved busy for the tech-foreign policy space, with the completion of the Telstra Digicel Pacific acquisition, Australia hosting the inaugural Space Policy Dialogue with South Korea, the establishment of the Australia-Japan Policy Dialogue on Telecommunications Resilience, and signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on the East Micronesia Cable Project.80

Australia's engagement with the Indo-Pacific strengthened during 2022. With a new government keen to engage with the region, and travel restrictions easing, trips within the region became a regular occurrence. The leadership of Wong in particular was a highlight, as she strengthened Australia's relations with Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Alongside this, new bilateral and multilateral agreements were formed, strengthening relations across the region. The new government presented a more confident, active, and engaged Australian partner to the region.

On 8 September, Australians woke up to the news that Queen Elizabeth II passed away at her home at Balmoral Castle. Her death marked the end of her seventy-year reign and the second Elizabethan era, remembered for decolonisation throughout the Commonwealth, the Cold War, unrest across the UK, and increased global media. In Australia, the Queen's death was marked by a two-week mourning period (longer than the UK's 10-day mourning period) and a public holiday in “honour of the life and service of our late Queen”.81 While as Albanese highlighted, for most Australians Queen Elizabeth was the only queen they knew, the public response to her death and the reaction around it was mixed, with most of the backlash on the two-week mourning period, the public holiday, and on the colonial legacy of the Crown.82 Australians looked back on the Queen's sixteen visits to Australia, her involvement in the dismissal of Gough Whitlam, and the celebrity-like nature of being a modern royal. Internationally, most leaders remembered the Queen for her gracious leadership and dignity.83

As this moment of sentimentality for the monarch passes with the coronation of King Charles, whose approval ratings are far below his mother's, we might expect a re-assessment of Australia's desire to be a republic. While some might have expected this to be a turning point for Australian politics, with many previously arguing that once the Queen passes,84 Australians will begin to call for a republic, this has not been the case. The mostly fond memories for many Australians of the queen have lived on. Broadly, Australians are able to separate the personal legacy of Queen Elizabeth from the monarchical institution and the Commonwealth. The moment could have been used by the Australian Republican Movement to bolster support; instead the group stepped back for a period of mourning. Questions of republicanism come at a tricky time in Australian politics, as Australia heads to the polls in the second half of 2023 for a referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament.

Contradictions will need to be worked out to successfully pursue a First Nations foreign policy – is it about representation or decolonisation? How can Australia support First Nations voices in foreign policy, while continuing to support colonisation in the region? In particular, strengthening relations with France comes at the cost to Australia's legitimacy, particularly in the Pacific where France remains a colonial power and has stalled independence elections in New Caledonia by changing its constitution to make decolonisation more difficult, negating its obligations to self-determination under international law.85 Marles has stated that “France is our neighbour. France is a Pacific country”.86 This sits uncomfortably for many in the Pacific who do not see France as a neighbour, but as a colonial power. As Nic Maclellan points out “it seems that the government's focus on France as a geopolitical partner is overriding any public commitment to self-determination and decolonisation”.87

Whereas Australia's relationship with the UK remained stable as the UK adjusted to its new reality, US-Australian relations strengthened under the leadership of Biden and Albanese. The second half of 2022 was a rough period for the United Kingdom, with three leadership changes and the death of Queen Elizabeth II. On 6 September Boris Johnson was replaced by Liz Truss; two days later the Queen passed. After a rocky term as Prime Minister, struggling to manage the UK's standard of living crisis, Truss was replaced in late October by Rishi Sunak.88 Thus for the UK, much of their focus was on domestic issues. For the US, mid-term elections took up their domestic focus, with strong voter turnout and a predicted Republican wave failing to eventuate due to under-performing Trump-backed candidates.89

The 2022 AUSMIN Meeting in Washington emphasised the ongoing deepening of Indo-Pacific cooperation, climate change and clean energy collaboration, resilient supply chains in line with the Biden Administration's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, defence and security cooperation and enhancing technological capabilities.90 All of these are standard topics for AUSMIN meetings. However, one of the more interesting additions to the Joint Statement was for the first time in AUSMIN Meetings, Indigenous and First Nations peoples were included. The Joint Leaders Statement discussed the inclusion of Indigenous voices “heard at the international level”, acknowledging “the exchange of best practices and development of cross-Pacific networks”.91 This is a welcome admission to AUSMIN, as Biden and Albanese demonstrated their understandings of a progressive foreign policy. For Australia, it is an example of how a First Nations Foreign Policy might work in practice, as we still wait for the announcement of Australia's first Ambassador for Indigenous people.

Australia's footprint in Washington has been gradually increasing since the announcement of AUKUS. In late 2021 the Centre for Strategic and International Studies announced the appointment of Charles Edel as its inaugural Australia chair, and in July 2022 the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) opened its Washington offices. Richard Marles formally opened the new ASPI offices, remarking that it is not just about being closer to the US's “centre of power”, but “giving an Australian flavour to the nature of the discussion”.92

In August, the government announced that it will be undertaking an independently led Defence Strategic Review, led by Stephen Smith, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence under the Rudd-Gillard governments, and Sir Angus Houston, former Chief of the Defence Force. The review “will help prepare Australia to effectively respond to the changing regional and global strategic environment and ensure Defence's capability and structure is fit for purpose and delivers the greatest return on investment”.93 It is set to be released in the first half of 2023, alongside the AUKUS Pillar I update.

September 2022 saw the first anniversary of the AUKUS agreement. Now a year into discussions, there still is not much new information on the program. What AUKUS actually is, beyond Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, remains unclear to many in Australia. The hype around nuclear-powered submarines has taken up a large portion of public debate since the announcement, with discussions on whether or not we need the submarines, the fallout of relations with France, and the sovereign cost to Australia.94 Since the AUKUS announcement, trilateral relations have strengthened. Each government has strengthened bureaucratic collaboration with one another. However, for Pillar II success in particular, US International Traffic in Arms Regulation Policy will need to be revised to ensure Australia can gain timely access to advanced capability and information sharing.95 September 2022 saw Australia and the UK establish a submarine training program on UK nuclear-powered Astute-class submarines.96 This pairs with a similar Bill proposed in the US Congress to train Australian submarine officers in the US.97 Beyond marking the anniversary of the AUKUS agreement, the sixth-month period did not see much progress on AUKUS. It looks like parameters of the agreement might expand to bring in Japan to collaborate on aspects of advanced capability under Pillar II.98

To send off 2022, Albanese made a special appearance at the Woodford Folk Festival – once again emphasising his ‘cool’ personal branding.99 At the Queensland festival, Albanese's speech felt like a celebration of the end of an era in foreign policy, and also the end of COVID lockdowns.100 He reminisced on the successes of his first year in office, remarking that “we have repaired our international relations and got Australia out of the naughty corner”.101 Renewed talks with China were a clear highlight for Albanese. On climate change, Albanese mentioned strengthened relations with Pacific states and assuming “our rightful place as a renewable energy superpower”.102 The big challenge for 2023 will be the referendum on a constitutionally enshrined First Nations Voice to Parliament and building on the momentum of 2022. Alongside this, more news on AUKUS will be announced, the Defence Strategic Review will be released, and Australia will host the Quad Leaders Meeting. With international travel returning and a new engaged Labor government, it feels as though Australia's place in the world has enlarged since the beginning of 2022.