Valentino D’Angelo , Mario Daniele Amore , Alessandro Minichilli , Kelly Xing Chen , Angelo Maria Solarino
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引用次数: 1
Abstract
Several firms around the world are led by multiple CEOs. Our study investigates how co-CEOs affect corporate investment under different conditions of ownership and governance. We argue that while family firms may invest more parsimoniously than non-family firms, the presence of multiple family CEOs raises overinvestment due to a potential divergence of personal agendas. Our analysis confirms that co-CEOs are conducive of excessive investment activities in family firms. This effect is lower when the family firm is subject to strong board monitoring, and higher when the co-CEOs belong to different family branches. Contrary to the view that families represent homogeneous groups with aligned interests and preferences, our study suggests that the fragmentation of leadership among multiple actors may be costly for the family business.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Family Business Strategy takes an international perspective, providing a platform for research that advances our understanding of family businesses. Welcoming submissions across various dimensions, the journal explores the intricate interplay between family dynamics and business operations, contributing new insights to this specialized field.
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