CEO network centrality and bank risk: Evidence from US Bank holding companies

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102501

Yaoyao Fan , Yuxiang Jiang , Pengcheng Jin , Yong Mai

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We investigate the impact of CEO network centrality, a central position in a social network, on bank risk. Using a sample of 471 bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US from 1999 to 2018, we find that CEO network centrality is negatively related to bank risk and this is due to CEOs with higher levels of network centrality implementing less risky policies. Additionally, we find that information flow and CEO power are two channels through which CEO network centrality reduces bank risk. Our empirical results still hold when we employ a battery of methods to mitigate endogeneity issues. Our research further extends a new strand of studies focusing on the specific position/hierarchy of executives/directors in a social network.

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CEO网络中心性与银行风险:来自美国银行控股公司的证据

我们研究了CEO网络中心性（社交网络中的中心地位）对银行风险的影响。使用1999年至2018年美国471家银行控股公司的样本，我们发现CEO网络中心性与银行风险呈负相关，这是由于网络中心性水平较高的CEO执行风险较小的政策。此外，我们发现信息流和CEO权力是CEO网络中心性降低银行风险的两个渠道。当我们采用一系列方法来缓解内生性问题时，我们的实证结果仍然成立。我们的研究进一步扩展了一系列新的研究，重点是高管/董事在社交网络中的特定职位/层级。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.