Clustered bids in first-price auctions: Collusion or competition?

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111393

Adriano De Leverano

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Clustering of the two most competitive bids in first-price auctions can be indicative of collusive behavior. However, it can also reflect non-cooperative strategies under complete information. I propose a simple procedure to distinguish between the two observationally equivalent explanations. This method requires the knowledge of winning bids and the determinants of the bid of the second most competitive bidder.

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首价拍卖中的集中竞价:共谋还是竞争?

在第一次价格拍卖中，两个最具竞争力的投标的聚类可以表明串通行为。然而，它也可以反映完全信息下的非合作策略。我提出了一个简单的程序来区分这两种在观测上等价的解释。这种方法需要了解中标情况以及第二个最具竞争力投标人的投标决定因素。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.