Experts, naturalism, and democracy

Abstract

Experts often play a fundamental role in decision-making processes. They are the bearers of an epistemic authority, which is primarily grounded on what we may call scientific naturalism. The main tenets of this view can clash though with other values characterising our pluralist societies. This may lead to conflicts but also to a devaluation or to a rejection of the sort of knowledge and advise offered by experts. In this paper we propose a new accommodation between scientific naturalism and the values of our democratic societies. In Section 1, we present a case study highlighting the problematicity of experts' decisions based on mere epistemic soundness. In Section 2, we frame our analysis of expertise in the context of a post-truth world. Section 3 looks at the relations between scientific naturalism and democracy, while Section 4 focuses on the potential clash between scientific naturalism and the normative character of other forms of knowledge. In Sections 5 and 6, we present practical instances of this clash (additional case studies), involving religious, bioethical, and cultural values. We show that in some cases these values ought to be granted full citizenship in a democratic state. This, (Section 7), leads us to a stalemate that seems to threaten the functioning of modern democracies. In Section 8, to overcome this stalemate, we propose to resort to a more inclusive form of naturalism, namely liberal naturalism. This form of naturalism cannot do without experts' scientific recommendations and yet does not end up excluding (a priori) alternatives forms of knowledge. We conclude, Section 9, by advocating a more liberal ecology of mechanisms for the regulation of decision-making processes; one that also encompasses socially inclusive (not necessarily scientific) processes of deliberation and judgment.