The dual scale model of weighing reasons

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
NOUS Pub Date : 2021-02-03 DOI:10.1111/NOUS.12361
C. Tucker
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

0. Introduction Ethical theory is steeped in two related metaphors: reasons have weight and reasons are weighed on a balance scale to determine an act’s deontic status (e.g., whether an act is permissible, impermissible, or required). Such metaphors are implicit in the ubiquitous talk of outweighing and the balance of reasons. The ubiquity of these metaphors gives them importance. If we are going to use or reject them, we should understand the best way of cashing them out. We may find, as I argue in this paper, that we can construct a promising model of how reasons interact to determine deontic status simply by cashing them out carefully. I assume that the metaphors of weight and weighing are apt for morality and practical rationality. So understood, substantive moral (rational) theories can make two kinds of mistake. First, a theory might incorrectly weight reasons. Perhaps, for example, it overestimates how much weight morality gives to self-interest. Second, a substantive theory might weigh reasons incorrectly. In principle, a theory might make one kind of mistake without making the other. This paper is after the fundamental model of weighing reasons to determine a deontic status, the model that determines what it is to weigh reasons correctly. Such a model can represent any normative theory that correctly weighs reasons, even if the theory incorrectly weights them. It can’t represent any theory that incorrectly weighs reasons. By identifying what it is to weigh reasons correctly, the fundamental model identifies structural constraints on any substantive moral or rational theory. The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ (Rφ) go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ (R~φ) go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two sides of the scale, determine the deontic status of the act.
称重原因的双秤模型
引言伦理理论充斥着两个相关的隐喻:理由有分量,理由是在天平上衡量的,以确定一个行为的道德地位(例如,一个行为是允许的、不允许的还是要求的)。这种隐喻隐含在无处不在的关于超越和理性平衡的讨论中。这些隐喻的普遍性赋予了它们重要性。如果我们要使用或拒绝它们,我们应该了解兑现它们的最佳方式。正如我在本文中所说,我们可能会发现,我们可以构建一个很有前途的模型,说明原因如何相互作用,只需小心地兑现它们,就可以确定道义地位。我认为重量和称重的隐喻适合道德和实践理性。如此理解,实质性的道德(理性)理论可能会犯两种错误。首先,一种理论可能会错误地权衡原因。例如,也许它高估了道德对自身利益的重视程度。其次,实质性理论可能会错误地权衡原因。原则上,一个理论可能会犯一种错误,而不会犯另一种错误。本文从衡量原因的基本模型入手,确定了一种道德状态,确定了什么是正确衡量原因的模型。这样的模型可以代表任何正确衡量原因的规范性理论,即使该理论对原因的权重不正确。它不能代表任何错误地衡量原因的理论。通过确定什么是正确衡量原因,基本模型确定了任何实质性道德或理性理论的结构约束。权衡原因的隐喻让人想起了一个单一的(双锅平衡)天平。φ(Rφ)的原因在一个盘中,而~φ(R~φ)的理由在另一个盘中。由天平两侧的相对高度表示的相对权重决定了行为的道义地位。
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来源期刊
NOUS
NOUS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.
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