Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk

IF 3.1 1区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jfi.2022.100995

Pramuan Bunkanwanicha , Alberta Di Giuli , Federica Salvade

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.

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救助后银行首席执行官的职业生涯：管理层更替对银行风险的影响

我们研究了银行救助是否影响CEO离职及其对银行风险的后续影响。利用2008年的问题资产救助计划(TARP)，我们发现TARP资金在危机期间(2008 - 2010年)暂时降低了银行CEO更替的可能性，但在危机之后显著增加了CEO更替的可能性。我们的研究结果表明，更换TARP首席执行官降低了个别银行的风险以及银行对系统风险的贡献。最后，我们发现问题资产救助计划首席执行官的更替主要是由银行政治资本的减少所驱动的。总体而言，我们提供的证据表明，银行救助对银行的风险承担和系统性风险有重要影响，因为救助会影响银行CEO的更替。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Intermediation BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

8.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Intermediation seeks to publish research in the broad areas of financial intermediation, financial market structure, corporate finance, risk management, and valuation.