Preface

Abstract

Few living scholars have had as much impact on the field of International Relations as Alexander Wendt. His breakout 1999 book, Social Theory of International Politics, established constructivism as a true peer competitor paradigm to realism, liberalism, and Marxism. He easily topped the 2014 TRIP survey as the scholar generally regarded as having had the greatest influence on the discipline over the previous 20 years. And he was a founding editor of what we, at least, like to think of as the premier journal in international theory. In 2015, Wendt published his second book, Quantum Mind and Social Science. Although not a study of International Relations per se, the book tackled what Wendt believed to be two of the deepest and most profound questions animating any and all social science: How is consciousness possible? What explains free will? These, in turn, led to further questions about what it means to be human and how humans interact in society. The answers, Wendt argued, lay, as the book’s subtitle suggests, in ‘unifying physical and social ontology’ – or, more specifically, in conceiving of consciousness as ‘the subjective manifestation of wave function collapse in the moment’ (p. 139) and of free will as a function of the indeterminacy of quantum brain systems. With such a unified ontology, Wendt argued, social science could finally be put on firm (panpsychist and vitalist) foundations. Wendt’s opus elicited reactions generally ranging from quizzical to skeptical to outright dismissive. It also led to a lively roundtable in a packed ballroom at the 2016 annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Atlanta, Georgia, that inspired the exchange that follows. Like the roundtable itself, it begins with Wendt making his case and throwing down a series of gauntlets. Social scientists, Wendt insists, have no choice but to come to terms with the problems of consciousness and will. Classical ontologies are not up to the task. Quantum physics is. In view of the fact that quantum is the only game in town, the burden of proof falls not on its proponents, but on its critics. And so forth and so on. The critics then have at him, sometimes taking up his challenges, sometimes rejecting them; firing at targets he offers, and at others in defilade; and occasionally trying to steer the