{"title":"Trade-off among stakeholders: CEO political orientation and corporate social irresponsibility","authors":"Livia Markoczy , Kalin D. Kolev , Cuili Qian","doi":"10.1016/j.lrp.2022.102273","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We draw on the Upper Echelons theory to investigate the effect of CEO liberalism—as reflected by core beliefs on the liberal-conservative spectrum—on firm engagement in corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We argue that CEO liberalism is related to an asymmetric treatment of shareholders and other non-shareholding stakeholders. Specifically, we distinguish CSI behavior toward shareholders from CSI behavior toward non-shareholding stakeholders and predict that while CEO liberalism reduces CSI behavior toward non-shareholding stakeholders, it also increases CSI behavior toward shareholders. We further identify governance contingency factors, such as institutional ownership, board composition, and compensation mechanisms, that moderate the predicted main relationships. We test our predictions with a sample of S&P 500 firms between 2000 and 2009 and find support for most of our hypotheses.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":18141,"journal":{"name":"Long Range Planning","volume":"56 2","pages":"Article 102273"},"PeriodicalIF":7.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Long Range Planning","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0024630122000929","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
We draw on the Upper Echelons theory to investigate the effect of CEO liberalism—as reflected by core beliefs on the liberal-conservative spectrum—on firm engagement in corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We argue that CEO liberalism is related to an asymmetric treatment of shareholders and other non-shareholding stakeholders. Specifically, we distinguish CSI behavior toward shareholders from CSI behavior toward non-shareholding stakeholders and predict that while CEO liberalism reduces CSI behavior toward non-shareholding stakeholders, it also increases CSI behavior toward shareholders. We further identify governance contingency factors, such as institutional ownership, board composition, and compensation mechanisms, that moderate the predicted main relationships. We test our predictions with a sample of S&P 500 firms between 2000 and 2009 and find support for most of our hypotheses.
期刊介绍:
Long Range Planning (LRP) is an internationally renowned journal specializing in the field of strategic management. Since its establishment in 1968, the journal has consistently published original research, garnering a strong reputation among academics. LRP actively encourages the submission of articles that involve empirical research and theoretical perspectives, including studies that provide critical assessments and analysis of the current state of knowledge in crucial strategic areas. The primary user base of LRP primarily comprises individuals from academic backgrounds, with the journal playing a dual role within this community. Firstly, it serves as a platform for the dissemination of research findings among academic researchers. Secondly, it serves as a channel for the transmission of ideas that can be effectively utilized in educational settings. The articles published in LRP cater to a diverse audience, including practicing managers and students in professional programs. While some articles may focus on practical applications, others may primarily target academic researchers. LRP adopts an inclusive approach to empirical research, accepting studies that draw on various methodologies such as primary survey data, archival data, case studies, and recognized approaches to data collection.