Act or Object

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
J. Butterworth
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Many standard definitions of ‘argument’ that recognise an ambiguity between its active and objective senses seek to subsume these in various ways into a single, composite whole. This, it is argued, glosses over the distinction instead of exploiting its elucidatory potential. Whilst optimistic about the prospects of theory integration, the paper recommends a methodology of differentiation as a first necessary step towards any such goal. It starts by assuming that ‘argument’ refers —simultaneously and independently— to two different things, making space between them for a theory of argument based on the then necessary externality of the relation between them.  
行为或客体
许多关于“论证”的标准定义都认识到它的主观性和客观性之间存在着歧义,试图以各种方式将它们纳入一个单一的、综合的整体。有人认为,这掩盖了区别,而不是利用其阐明的潜力。虽然对理论整合的前景持乐观态度,但本文建议将区分方法作为实现任何此类目标的第一步。它首先假定“论证”是指——同时地、独立地——两种不同的事物,为一种基于它们之间关系的必要外部性的论证理论在它们之间留出空间。
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来源期刊
Informal Logic
Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.
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