{"title":"The Ethics of Attention: Engaging the Real with Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil by Silvia Caprioglio Panizza (Routledge, 2022). ISBN 9780367756932","authors":"Cathy Mason","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000116","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Attention, Iris Murdoch tells us in ‘The Idea of Perfection’, is ‘the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’ (Murdoch, 1999, p. 327).1 She takes this to be the characteristic and proper mark of moral agents, a claim that is both descriptive – a claim about what in fact characterises us as agents – and normative – a claim about how we should act, what we need to do more of in order to become better moral agents. Silvia Caprioglio Panizza followsMurdoch inmaking both of these claims. Her new book The Ethics of Attention is an extended discussion of the role and importance of attention within our moral lives. Panizza here draws on the work of Murdoch and Simone Weil to explore the nature andmoral importance of attention. This commonplace and recognisable activity, she suggests, is both essential for accessing moral truth and also morally significant in and of itself. Moreover, it is ‘fundamental to morality’ (p. 16) in that many of the other things we care about morally (such as moral knowledge andmoralmotivation) arewell understood as depending on attention. The first chapter outlines Panizza’s conception of attention and makes a case for its moral significance. Her basic understanding of attention is that it is a ‘truth-seeking engagement of the individual with reality’ (p. 24), though she stresses that this is a non-exhaustive characterization of it. This notion of attention as engagement underlies her explanation of why attention is inherently morally significant: it is morally significant, she suggests, because in attending we engage with reality, with truth, rather than with our own selfish concerns and","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"403 - 407"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000116","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Attention, Iris Murdoch tells us in ‘The Idea of Perfection’, is ‘the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’ (Murdoch, 1999, p. 327).1 She takes this to be the characteristic and proper mark of moral agents, a claim that is both descriptive – a claim about what in fact characterises us as agents – and normative – a claim about how we should act, what we need to do more of in order to become better moral agents. Silvia Caprioglio Panizza followsMurdoch inmaking both of these claims. Her new book The Ethics of Attention is an extended discussion of the role and importance of attention within our moral lives. Panizza here draws on the work of Murdoch and Simone Weil to explore the nature andmoral importance of attention. This commonplace and recognisable activity, she suggests, is both essential for accessing moral truth and also morally significant in and of itself. Moreover, it is ‘fundamental to morality’ (p. 16) in that many of the other things we care about morally (such as moral knowledge andmoralmotivation) arewell understood as depending on attention. The first chapter outlines Panizza’s conception of attention and makes a case for its moral significance. Her basic understanding of attention is that it is a ‘truth-seeking engagement of the individual with reality’ (p. 24), though she stresses that this is a non-exhaustive characterization of it. This notion of attention as engagement underlies her explanation of why attention is inherently morally significant: it is morally significant, she suggests, because in attending we engage with reality, with truth, rather than with our own selfish concerns and
Iris Murdoch在《完美的理念》(The Idea of Perfect)一书中告诉我们],注意力是“对个人现实的公正和充满爱的凝视”(Murdoch,1999,第327页),为了成为更好的道德代理人,我们需要做更多的事情。Silvia Caprioglio Panizza追随Murdoch对这两种说法的理解。她的新书《注意力的伦理学》对注意力在我们道德生活中的作用和重要性进行了深入的讨论。帕尼扎在这里借鉴默多克和西蒙娜·威尔的作品,探讨注意力的本质和口头重要性。她认为,这种常见且可识别的活动对获取道德真理至关重要,本身也具有道德意义。此外,它是“道德的基础”(第16页),因为我们在道德上关心的许多其他事情(如道德知识和道德运动)都被很好地理解为依赖于注意力。第一章概述了帕尼扎的注意观,并举例说明其道德意义。她对注意力的基本理解是,它是“个人与现实的真诚接触”(第24页),尽管她强调这是对它的非详尽描述。这种将注意力视为参与的概念是她解释为什么注意力本质上具有道德意义的基础:她认为,它具有道德意义,因为在参与时,我们与现实接触,用真理,而不是我们自己的自私
期刊介绍:
Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.