Strafe als Vergeltung: Plädoyer für einen hermeneutischen Retributivismus

Abstract

Retributivism is usually taken to be a theory of the justification of punishment. In this contribution, I develop an alternative understanding of retributivism. Rather than as a theory of the justification of punishment, I propose to regard it as a hermeneutic theory, i.e.a theory about how we understand (some) punishments. I start with an explanation of what "hermeneutical retributivism" is (1). In what follows, I examine the ramifications of this view (2). It leads to a different assessment of the relation between retributive theories and prevention theories (2.1) and of the relation between punishments and non-punitive mea- sures such as preventive custody (2.2). It also leads to a reconceptualisation of the problem of the justification of punishments (2.3). Some concluding remarks summarize the arguments in favor of hermeneutical retributivism (3).