Introspection

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
A. Besedin, D. B. Volkov, Anton Kuznetsov, E. Loginov, Andrey V. Mertsalov
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The article is a review of the philosophical problems of introspection as a method of cognition that are actively discussed in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. The article is the result of discussions that were held during the Summer School “Consciousness and Introspection” organized in July 2020 by the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies and led by Professor D. Stoljar, one of the top experts in this field. The purpose of the article is to describe to readers the current state of affairs in the English language research in this area. Modern theories of introspection have been formed as a result of discussions in the philosophy of mind and epistemology in the XX century. One of them is S. Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of introspection and the related problem of self-blindness. Another topic is the transparency of experience (G.E. Moore, G. Evans). Finally, D. Dretske offered an influential critique of introspection in general. The discussion of these topics led to the arising of various modern theories: rationalistic (A. Byrne, D. Stoljar), acquaintance theories (B. Gertler, D. Chalmers), constitutive (S. Shoemaker), simple (D. Smithies), and others. An important area in which introspection finds their application is the philosophy of consciousness. The article considers the thesis of revelation, according to which the conscious state reveals its essence in introspection: the relation of this thesis to folk psychology is analyzed (D. Lewis, D. Stoljar), arguments against physicalism based on it are considered (P. Goff). Finally, the authors consider illusionist approaches to introspection based on the understanding of introspection as a representative system (D. Dennett, K. Frankish). Proponents of these approaches suggest the most acute criticism of introspection, pointing out its unreliability as a method of cognition, and, accordingly, the inapplicability of introspection in the philosophy of consciousness. Objections to this position are represented by M. Nida-Rumelin. This work does not pretend to consider all the existing theories of introspection and related problems. However, this review can give an idea of the main positions and problems in this area and assess the prospects for its development.
自省
本文回顾了当代精神分析哲学中积极讨论的内省作为一种认知方法的哲学问题。这篇文章是在2020年7月由莫斯科意识研究中心组织的暑期学校“意识与内省”期间进行的讨论的结果,该研究由该领域的顶级专家之一D. Stoljar教授领导。本文的目的是向读者描述这一领域英语语言研究的现状。现代内省理论是二十世纪心灵哲学和认识论讨论的结果。其中之一是S.舒梅克对内省的知觉模型和相关的自我盲目性问题的批判。另一个主题是经验的透明度(G.E. Moore, G. Evans)。最后,德雷茨克对一般的内省提出了有影响力的批评。对这些话题的讨论导致了各种现代理论的产生:理性理论(A. Byrne, D. Stoljar),熟人理论(B. Gertler, D. Chalmers),构成理论(S. Shoemaker),简单理论(D. Smithies)等等。内省的一个重要应用领域是意识哲学。本文考察了意识状态在内省中揭示其本质的启示命题,分析了这一命题与民间心理学的关系(D. Lewis, D. Stoljar),并在此基础上讨论了反对物理主义的论点(P. Goff)。最后,作者考虑了基于内省作为一种代表性系统的理解的幻觉主义内省方法(D. Dennett, K. Frankish)。这些方法的支持者对内省提出了最尖锐的批评,指出它作为一种认知方法的不可靠性,因此,内省在意识哲学中的不适用性。Nida-Rumelin先生代表反对这一立场。这项工作并没有假装考虑所有现有的内省理论和相关问题。然而,通过对这一领域的主要立场和问题的回顾,可以对其发展前景进行评估。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
25.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Epistemology & Philosophy of Science is a quarterly peer-reviewed journal established in 2004 by the Institute of Philosophy (Russian Academy of Sciences). It is devoted to the themes in modern epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The journal supports the policy of interdisciplinarity. It’s based on the belief that the comprehensive analysis of cultural phenomena couldn’t be completed without focusing on the problems of cognition. The epistemological analysis, however, needs the research results from human, social and natural sciences. Sections of the journal: 1.Editorial 2.Panel Discussion 3.Epistemology and Cognition 4.Language and Mind 5.Vista 6.Case Studies -Science Studies 7.Interdisciplinary Studies 8.Archive 9.Symposium 10.Book Reviews
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