Eudaimonism and the Ground of Normative Reasons

IF 0.5 3区 哲学 0 RELIGION
Kevin Jung
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of normative reasons in eudaimonism while also taking a page from Scotus's ethics. I argue that the main issue with eudaimonism is with the ultimate end and manner of our willing, which fails to correspond to the right ordering of love based on the nature of goodness in the object.

理想主义与规范理性的基础
本文提出了一个反对幸福论的论点,以支持约翰·黑尔早期对幸福论的批判。与黑尔相反,他提出了康德-苏格兰主义的反对意见,反对他所谓的幸福论中动机的单一来源观点,我对幸福论的批评侧重于幸福论中规范原因的基础,同时也借鉴了斯各脱斯的伦理学。我认为,唯美论的主要问题在于我们意志的最终目的和方式,它无法与基于对象善良本性的爱的正确顺序相对应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: Founded in 1973, the Journal of Religious Ethics is committed to publishing the very best scholarship in religious ethics, to fostering new work in neglected areas, and to stimulating exchange on significant issues. Emphasizing comparative religious ethics, foundational conceptual and methodological issues in religious ethics, and historical studies of influential figures and texts, each issue contains independent essays, commissioned articles, and a book review essay, as well as a Letters, Notes, and Comments section. Published primarily for scholars working in ethics, religious studies, history of religions, and theology, the journal is also of interest to scholars working in related fields such as philosophy, history, social and political theory, and literary studies.
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