Continuity and catastrophic risk

IF 1.2 2区哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-07-07 DOI:10.1017/S0266267121000146

H. Stefánsson

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called ‘continuity for easy cases’ while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is ‘no’: given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition.

查看原文本刊更多论文

连续性和灾难性风险

摘要假设决策者在确定性条件下的目标是最大化某些持续价值，如终身收入或持续社会福利。这样的决策者能否合理地满足所谓的“简单情况下的连续性”，同时满足似乎是对预期效用理论的全面连续性公理的广泛直觉？在这篇文章中，我认为答案是“否”：给定传递性和弱权衡原则，简单情况下的连续性违反了反连续性直觉。最后，我探索了一个更弱的连续性条件，它与前面提到的直觉一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Economics and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.