Adverse inclusion of asymmetric advertisers in position auctions

IF 5.9 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Zibin Xu , Yi Zhu , Shantanu Dutta
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Product listing platforms commonly use generalized second-price auctions to select competing advertisers for limited ad positions. However, when advertisers are asymmetric, position auctions may confound the post-auction competition structure and thus endogenize the bidders’ values of the ad positions. We build an analytical model to examine the impact of position auctions on an asymmetric market structure, which consists of a mass marketer and two specialized advertisers of heterogeneous quality efficiencies. The advertisers bid for two ad slots and then compete for the market in price and quality. We find that the asymmetric market structure may increase the uncertainty of the auction outcomes, which then may induce the advertisers to underbid using a conservative strategy profile in the locally-envy free equilibrium. Consequently, the auction outcome may adversely include the less-efficient specialized advertiser. This result is stronger than the position paradox in the classic auction literature, as the advertiser with a competitive advantage may be driven out and obtain zero profit.

不对称广告客户在职位拍卖中的不利纳入
产品上市平台通常使用广义的第二价格拍卖来选择有限广告位置的竞争广告商。然而,当广告商不对称时,位置拍卖可能会混淆拍卖后的竞争结构,从而内生投标人的广告位置价值。我们建立了一个分析模型来检验头寸拍卖对不对称市场结构的影响,该市场结构由一个大规模营销人员和两个质量效率异质的专业广告商组成。广告商竞标两个广告位,然后在价格和质量上争夺市场。我们发现,不对称的市场结构可能会增加拍卖结果的不确定性,这可能会导致广告商在局部无嫉妒均衡中使用保守的策略来降低出价。因此,拍卖结果可能不利地包括效率较低的专业广告商。这一结果比经典拍卖文献中的位置悖论更强,因为具有竞争优势的广告商可能会被赶出去,并获得零利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
11.80
自引率
4.30%
发文量
77
审稿时长
66 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Research in Marketing is an international, double-blind peer-reviewed journal for marketing academics and practitioners. Building on a great tradition of global marketing scholarship, IJRM aims to contribute substantially to the field of marketing research by providing a high-quality medium for the dissemination of new marketing knowledge and methods. Among IJRM targeted audience are marketing scholars, practitioners (e.g., marketing research and consulting professionals) and other interested groups and individuals.
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