Can auctions increase competition in the pension funds market? The Chilean experience

IF 3.5 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Rodrigo Harrison , Marcela Parada-Contzen , Marcelo Villena
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper analyses the auction policy over enrollees’ monopoly rights introduced in the Chilean pension system. This policy was designed to promote competition in the pension fund market driven by private firms, after 30 years of operation. Since the Chilean pension fund system has inspired dozens of countries in the last forty years, the analysis of the design and performance of its relatively new auction mechanism is of worldwide interest. We present a theoretical and empirical model. Our theoretical model illustrates firms’ incentives to participate in the auction process. Our empirical analysis focuses on the effect of auctions on outcomes, such as fees, mark-ups, demand price elasticity, returns, and risk premiums. Despite the evidence shown for the positive benefits of the auction implementation, the current mechanism design is not considering that the biggest issue is the low individuals’ price response levels. Importantly, the current auction design only incentivizes new entrants to participate. Thus, the design generates low competition in the auction processes. Proper design should incentivize all firms to participate. Besides, we find that consumers’ price elasticity increased after the implementation of auctions, although demand is still generally inelastic. Interestingly, non-winning auction firms did not react in fees but may have reacted in other characteristics, such as returns and risk premiums.

拍卖能增加养老基金市场的竞争吗?智利的经验
本文对智利养老金制度引入的参保人垄断权拍卖政策进行了分析。这一政策旨在促进由民营企业主导的养老基金市场的竞争。由于智利养老基金制度在过去四十年中启发了几十个国家,对其相对较新的拍卖机制的设计和表现的分析引起了全世界的兴趣。我们提出了一个理论和实证模型。我们的理论模型说明了企业参与拍卖过程的动机。我们的实证分析侧重于拍卖对结果的影响,如费用、加价、需求价格弹性、回报和风险溢价。尽管有证据表明拍卖实施的积极效益,但目前的机制设计没有考虑到最大的问题是低个人的价格反应水平。重要的是,目前的拍卖设计只会激励新进入者参与。因此,该设计在拍卖过程中产生了低竞争。适当的设计应该激励所有企业参与。此外,我们发现,在实施拍卖后,消费者的价格弹性有所增加,尽管需求仍然普遍缺乏弹性。有趣的是,没有获胜的拍卖公司并没有在费用方面做出反应,但可能在其他方面做出了反应,比如回报和风险溢价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.40%
发文量
76
期刊介绍: The Journal of Policy Modeling is published by Elsevier for the Society for Policy Modeling to provide a forum for analysis and debate concerning international policy issues. The journal addresses questions of critical import to the world community as a whole, and it focuses upon the economic, social, and political interdependencies between national and regional systems. This implies concern with international policies for the promotion of a better life for all human beings and, therefore, concentrates on improved methodological underpinnings for dealing with these problems.
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