Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS

Research in Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2023.05.001

Georgy Lukyanov

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper develops a uniform-quadratic cheap-talk setting of Crawford add Sobel (1982), in which the sender may be uninformed and cares about his reputation for competence (that is, for being informed). We establish the existence of a partition equilibrium with two messages and show how this equilibrium is affected when we change the exogenous parameters: the sender’s bias, the initial belief that the sender is competent and the sender’s reputational concerns. We also show that if the reputational concerns are high enough and the sender’s initial reputation is extremely low or extremely high, there exists a fully informative equilibrium in which the competent sender perfectly reveals the state. Possible extensions of the setup are discussed. One possible application of our model might be the interaction between media provider and the public.

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在廉价谈话环境中以能力著称

本文发展了Crawford和Sobel(1982)的一致二次型廉价谈话设定，其中发件人可能不知情，并且关心他的能力声誉(即被告知)。我们用两个信息建立了分区均衡的存在，并展示了当我们改变外生参数时，这个均衡是如何受到影响的:发送者的偏见，发送者有能力的初始信念和发送者的声誉问题。我们还表明，如果声誉关注足够高，而发送者的初始声誉极低或极高，则存在一个完全信息均衡，在该均衡中，有能力的发送者完美地揭示了状态。讨论了该设置的可能扩展。我们的模型的一个可能的应用可能是媒体提供商和公众之间的互动。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.