Bound to fail? Assessing contemporary left populism

Abstract

It has been more than ten years since the first signs indicating the contemporary (re)emergence of left populism were observed: the proto-populist movements of “the squares” such as the Indignados in Spain, Aganaktismenoi in Greece, the Occupy Movement in the United States, and the various uprisings of “the Arab Spring.” A variety of political formations succeeded them, channeling their energy onto electoral representation with mixed results—such as SYRIZA in Greece, PODEMOS in Spain, the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn within the Labour party in the United Kingdom, the presidential candidacy of Bernie Sanders in the United States, but also the comeback of left populism in the Latin American continent. The whole experience seems to have resulted in evident skepticism in left-wing circles about the effectiveness of “populism” as a political strategy for the left.

In this context, the rise and fall of SYRIZA, and in particular its failure to materialize its economic promise to cancel a Eurozone-enforced austerity, became emblematic of the supposed end of “the populist moment.” The American left magazine Jacobin, for example, recently dedicated a whole issue to left populism. The dominant (skeptic) strand of authors maintained that “[s]hort-lived and cruel, Europe's experiment in left populism had ground to a halt” (Jäger, 2019a, p. 127). As Jäger concludes, the left had “bet the house on populism – and lost” (Jäger, 2019a, p. 124). The solution put forward for the left that experimented with the temptation of populism seems to involve a return to its original socialist values (Sunkara, 2019). Skepticism about populism is indeed prevalent in left academic and political circles. The “left critique” of left populism seems to be grounded on the hypothesis that more “class politics” and less “populist politics” is the answer for a successful future trajectory for the contemporary left. Populism is often perceived as a form of left reformism that contaminated at some point an originary class-based purity and for this reason is (necessarily) bound to fail (Seferiades, 2020; Sotiris, 2019).

To tackle these questions, our starting hypothesis is that a re-emerging nostalgia of unmediated class purity may be of little help here. Arguments according to which left populism fails because it contaminates left purity seem to reoccupy an essentialist and reductionist terrain, ultimately misrecognizing the articulatory (impure) character of political formations and collective subjects. Such is the link established between populism (form) and the left (ideological and policy content). A link established, in fact, very long ago, well before Laclau and Mouffe, on the basis of registering the failure and gradually abandoning a prior logic of necessity. Arguably, a rigorous evaluation of left populism cannot be exclusively limited to an assessment of this particular theoretico-political project (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) and should be debated within a much broader terrain that also encompasses a long tradition going back to Marx himself.¹

To reintroduce the logics of necessity and contamination seems to betray an obsolete reductionist rationale; it also indicates a rather selective memory. For the articulation between the left and populism emerged precisely on the ground of this prior failure of left/class purity (see Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, especially the first two chapters). The reasons for this failure have not been lifted; if anything, they are more pertinent today and this cannot be disavowed in elaborating left strategy. On the other hand, although such an articulation may still be able to help left strategy within particular (mainly electoral) contexts, it cannot—at least not in isolation, not on its own, through the opposite reduction of the left to an essentialist, a priori triumphant populism—guarantee a rosy emancipatory future. We are thus firmly located within an ambivalent articulatory space overdetermining strategy within competitive and antagonistic political terrains.

Our central argument is that the bumpy but not inconsequential applications of left populism (often revealing its limitations, but also, as we shall see below, the limitations of “the left” itself) neither suffice to command retreat nor can they guarantee progressive social change with other means (class-based purity). Our argument rests on a series of alternative assumptions. First, one needs to distinguish—analytically at least—populist form from ideological and policy content and their successful or unsuccessful implementation in different moments (elections, governmental terms, etc.). Only by defining anew what exactly is “left” and what is “populist” and how they become articulated can one develop rigorous criteria of (relative) success and failure. Second, against a background that betrays a linear and deterministic view of history, we argue that political antagonism follows a contingent choreography and is subject to unpredictable sedimentation(s) and reactivation(s) (Laclau, 1990). Thus, the question of the suitability of populist strategy cannot be resolved a priori at an abstract level ignoring the historico-political context. Only by articulating a more comprehensive, open-ended, and less arrogant historical sensibility could we perhaps arrive at more pertinent strategic suggestions.

Accordingly, this paper is structured as follows: the first section attempts to differentially identify left populism in a rigorous way, highlighting the form/policy parallax and formulating specific criteria for assessing its success/failure. The second section offers an overview of the trajectory that contemporary left populism followed (mostly but not exclusively in Europe). Drawing on the conceptual apparatus deployed in the first section and the empirical overview articulated in the second section, the third section discusses the assumption that populism constitutes a strategy incompatible with the left in the sense that it will inevitably fail to implement a radical program in power, signaling the eventual death of the populist moment for the left. The discussion brings to the fore the historically intimate relationship socialists, including Marx, kept with populism. It argues that political cycles are always historically contingent and subject to reactivation, while it also highlights the need to seriously discuss the limitations of both leftist orientation(s) and populist strategy(s) in contemporary times. Populism's dismissal, we argue, seems to be influenced by the profoundly anti-populist liberal mainstream that has influenced the left too.

In this section, we attempt to define left populism. Our conceptual strategy unfolds in two steps. By inquiring into the two notions that comprise our conceptual dyad, “left” and “populism,” we first seek to disentangle and approach each notion individually. First, we theorize populism, to which we refer predominantly as form; second, we theorize the left component to which we will refer as content—that is to say, the programmatic and ideological component that accompanies populist strategy. In the final part of this section, we discuss the extent to which these two sides are analytically distinct to each other, but also the extent to which they can be combined.²

Left populism re-emerged in light of the social exhaustion, discontent, and political de-alignment in the years after the 2008 financial collapse. The square movements in Spain, the United States as well as various instances that formed part of the Arab Spring marked a turn in the politics of the last decade. These movements put forward demands in favor of democracy, equality, dignity, and economic justice, and introduced a distinct symbolism and jargon for the contemporary left. Transferring the legacy of the alter-globalization movement onto the electoral arena, these proto-populist movements questioned the political establishment, highlighted the void in political representation, and demanded the return of “the demos” to the forefront of decision-making (Gerbaudo, 2017).

Following this (pre-)populist conjuncture, numerous electoral experiments seeking ways out of the left's chronic deadlock (often due to a class-based particularism) became evident in the left hemisphere. Some addressed questions of participation and focused on digital forms of organization, communication, and democracy (Deseriis, 2017). While many favored a movement-oriented structure, others favored more hierarchical organization and others a blend of both (Della Porta et al., 2017). Some pushed for more radicalism in terms of their left discourse and program, like Slovenia's Levica (Toplišek, 2019), and others presented higher degrees of populist framing as opposed to classical socialist rhetoric like the Corbyn leadership of the Labour Party (Maiguashca & Dean, 2019). There are also “disputed” or “borderline” cases, such as the Dutch Socialist Party and Die Linke in Germany: although populist repertoires have been frequently employed by the two parties, populism cannot be considered as the main logic that defines these two left-wing parties as its employment seems to be a matter of an occasional mode of communication. In the case of the Dutch Socialist Party, Lucardie and Voerman (2019) distinguish between weak and strong populism. In the case of Die Linke, Hough and Keith (2019) show how degrees of populism enlisted depend on the arena where discourse is communicated as well as on which member of the party articulates it. In France, one observed an “idiosyncratic type” of populism infused with very “French characteristics.” France Insoumise’s left program was blended with “staunch patriotism,” drew on the French republican tradition, and was heavily centered around the figure of its leader, Jean-Luc-Mélenchon (Marlière, 2019). The “patriotic variant” of left populism provoked “the left” and sparked discussions in that references to “the homeland” were framed as paradoxical against the typical left narrative that supposedly needs to be exclusively internationalist. This peculiar style of left politics seemed to combine a rather inclusionary type of nationalism, or patriotism as themselves would call it, that drew on the notion of “the homeland” as a key locus of articulation and simultaneously advocated for the incorporation of migrants and minorities into its sociopolitical vision.⁵

What becomes evident is that contemporary left populism names a polymorphic collection of political experiments that often shared little in terms of their internal architecture, organizational dynamics, types of leadership, and programmatic agendas. But, importantly, their logic of articulation prioritized profoundly people-centrism and anti-elitism (followed, secondarily and to different degrees, by traditional class-based leftist traits). Contemporary left populism employed a renewed political vocabulary, aesthetic, and style that extended beyond those of both the orthodox left and the center-left. It contested the status quo and sought to subvert it; it opened up discussions about the reorganization and reorientation of the left and its strategy in light of the impasse amply illustrated by the events of 1968 and 1989; it brought “the party” and the state back onto the center of the debate; and, ultimately, it set out a clear demand to govern rather than abandoning the central political arena (Agustín & Briziarelli, 2018) or voluntarily occupying the margins (gaining peace of mind and avoiding difficult challenges by condemning the left to voluntary insignificance).

Let us now zoom into two specific left populist parties that attracted significant academic and public attention and whose (downward) trajectory was framed as the end of the populist moment for the left. Spain's PODEMOS could be considered as a paradigmatic case of left-wing populism. The party placed at the core of its discourse the promise to “restore popular sovereignty” and constructed sharp frontiers between “la gente” as the ordinary citizens who are disadvantaged and excluded from political decisions and “la casta” as the corrupt two-party system. PODEMOS constituted “an original case of interweaving political philosophy and democratic radicalism” mainly inspired by the theories and strategic proposals of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and by the Latin American populist experience (Valdvielso, 2017, p. 1). This was evident in the incorporation of Laclauian terminology in PODEMOS’ discourse and the close politico-theoretical exchange that Chantal Mouffe maintained with PODEMOS’ “number two,” Íñigo Errejón (see Mouffe & Errejón, 2016). PODEMOS sought to turn itself into an “electoral machine,” which skyrocketed the party's popularity already within a few months after its emergence, creating a serious threat to the political establishment. However, PODEMOS never won the state. Its institutional engagement, even in the opposition of the Spanish parliament, was accompanied by critical setbacks, and its electoral momentum faded. Eventually, PODEMOS’ leadership entered a series of bitter fights between the Pablistas who represented the left flank of the party and the Errejonistas who supported the populist hypothesis. That, interwoven with the various attempts to form coalitions with forces that the party previously considered part of “the establishment”—as well as the rise of centrist and far-right “populist” competitors such as Ciudadanos and Vox—made PODEMOS loose much of its credibility. In 2018, PODEMOS reached an agreement with the social-democratic PSOE to form a government on a progressive social policy agenda.

The most promising example of radical-left populism was arguably SYRIZA in Greece. The party emerged out of the post-2008 cycle of resurgent popular mobilization to demand state power and the reversal of neoliberal policies (Katsambekis, 2016). The stakes were high, as were the promises made by Alexis Tsipras—and the hopes the people placed on his shoulders. Yet, already a few months into its administration—suffering its lack of leverage in its negotiations with international creditors—SYRIZA was forced to sign a harsh austerity agreement (Katsambekis, 2019). Soon, SYRIZA's story took on different names, marking the bitter taste it left for the Greek and the international left: “capitulation,” “the Greek case,” “SYRIZA's failure,” and even “the betrayal.” To be sure, there were many policy areas where SYRIZA attempted to safeguard and modestly expand the last remaining bastions of social rights for the marginalized strata. For example, measures that the left party implemented once in government included offering free health care to 2 million uninsured people, free meals to school children, a minimum solidarity income for the poor, a hold on family home repossessions, a restructuring of non-serviced loans, a law granting citizenship to second-generation immigrants, and recognition of civil partnership for same-sex couples and of the right of same-sex couples to adopt and foster children (Douzinas, 2017; Katsambekis, 2019; Tambakaki, 2019). However, SYRIZA's failure to deliver its key promises may have been pivotal in the downward trajectory the party followed. After all, SYRIZA initially rose to power by promoting a program centered around economic demands for the restoration of the popular sectors’ previous conditions and, most importantly, the cancelling of the Greek debt and the reversal of austerity measures. In other words, left populism brought SYRIZA to power; however, the inability to push forward its policy agenda (the “left” component of left populism) gradually affected its ability to mobilize the popular sectors and to operate as a salient point of populist identification—and not the other way round. The July 2019 elections in Greece brought the right-wing establishment back to power. What SYRIZA offered was too little too late. However, it is important to note that the percentage SYRIZA secured (31.53%) was “only” 3.93% lower than the one the party gained in 2015 when it achieved power (35.46%).

Our brief overview has shown that an array of contemporary left actors employed populism to different degrees—revealing a rich typology of left populism(s): as rich as the distinct left variants, currents, and sects of the non-populist left.⁶ Some parties employed populism as a communication strategy to capture power, while, for some others, populism functioned as an integral logic structuring their identity. Thus, it becomes necessary to acknowledge the diverse and complex character of left populism. Left populism cannot be reduced to a single monolithic category (as it usually happens with “populism” in abstracto thus disorienting populism research). We can perhaps distinguish between core/agential/strategic/political and peripheral/communicative/tactical/electoral (left) populism. The former would refer to hegemonic forms of populism rooted in salient identifications, such as (left) Peronism in Argentina. The latter would refer to communicational instances of populism that are tactically employed (consciously or unconsciously) in precise moments, such as electoral campaigns. Both SYRIZA and Jeremy Corbyn were proven to be such cases. Besides, they both failed to take seriously popular choice expressed through referendums and thus gradually lost their agential dynamism (to sustain an interpellation/identification loop producing long-term affective collective subjectivities) (see Meadway, 2021).

As our analysis has shown, some of the political actors briefly reviewed above remained fringe parties in opposition; many have gradually entered parliaments, taking up the role of challenger actors; a few threatened incumbent governments; while only one, SYRIZA, has achieved power as a major partner and one, PODEMOS, as a minor partner in coalition. Nonetheless, after having reached a peak in 2015, the left populist cycle that sparked in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis became increasingly weakened in Europe; and, ironically, many of these vocal radical leftists relocated further to the center. Does this signify the end of left populism? In this section, we pragmatically discuss the merits and limitations of left populism—because, obviously, both exist—and ask anew whether populism can be seen—on balance—as a suitable co-traveler with the left. We critically assess the “success”/“failure” of left populism by bringing into dialogue the critical conceptual and hermeneutical strategies deployed in the earlier sections with the empirical contemporary phenomena discussed in the previous one. In what follows, we revisit, once more, the assumption that populism—as another name for reformism—is an incompatible strategy for the left that will inevitably fail to implement a radical program in power, signifying the end of the populist moment for the left.

In this article, we explored the relationship between “populism” and “the left.” We sought to provide conceptual clarity. Thus, our first priority was to distinguish hermeneutically “the left” from “populism” and then define their joint formation as a discursive/political (mobilizational) logic that frames leftist programmatic content as the “common sense” politics of “the people” promising the restoration of popular sovereignty. This strategy is particularly relevant for our inquiry into a major (and recurring) conceptual and strategic discussion on the intellectual and political left that, following the setbacks of contemporary left-wing populism, seems to argue that the populist moment is over for the left.

This argument seems to be grounded on the conception that “more class” and “less populist” politics could lead the left out of its current deadlock. Yet, in our understanding, the dichotomy between “class” and “populism” is false in that it ascribes (a priori) to class politics the status of an infallible (pure) truth and to populism the status of (impure) reformism (see also Mouffe, 2018). We find this position problematic in two respects. First, our overview of contemporary left populism showed that its evident setbacks and defeats are rooted in the abandonment of left programmatic theses (such as to reverse austerity, to redistribute wealth, to expand sociopolitical inclusion to the marginalized, including migrants) and not in the abandonment of people-centrism and anti-elitism (that define populism)—however, the scope for strategic moves can be weakened when a policy agenda encounters limits. At any rate, one should better examine the retreat of left populism by focusing on the radical left content and not its populist shaping; it is the latter that brought the former policy agenda to the fore, although it could not guarantee its long-term success. Second, this position is historically unsubstantiated in that various leftist projects across time and space have (consciously or not) employed a populist strategy in order to create popular fronts and expand their appeal to the wider population. Indeed, some of these projects can be described as reformist; however, others exhibited more radical commitments. Even more surprisingly, through our genealogical examination we highlighted that even Marx himself showed an increasing interest in populism toward the last few years of his life, to the degree that references to the proletariat were gradually reduced.

Populism's dismissal seems to be influenced by the profoundly anti-populist liberal mainstream that has influenced the left too. But this is not to say that populism is a panacea. Populism may have been the main strategic option for the post-crash left, and in fact it has driven it out of its long inwardness; but this does not mean that it always constitutes the preferable strategy for the left or that it guarantees success a priori (either in opposition or in power). Yet identifying “populism” as the root cause of all failure seems to obscure a necessary pragmatic evaluation regarding what went wrong with its recent terms in government. This discussion needs to proceed urgently because left populism may soon bring left-wing forces back to government, as it has already started happening in Latin America.