Earnings expectations and the quality of financial services

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Xiaomeng Shi , Duc Duy Nguyen , Mingzhu Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Using complaint data filed by consumers with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau against financial institutions, we show that banks receive, on average, 13.3% more customer complaints in the quarter immediately after they narrowly beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The effect is mainly driven by banks’ attempts to reduce their non-interest expenses to beat earnings benchmarks. The relationship is stronger when bank CEOs receive a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation. Overall, our paper demonstrates how capital market incentives exacerbate shareholder–customer conflicts.

盈利预期和金融服务质量
利用消费者向消费者金融保护局(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau)提交的针对金融机构的投诉数据,我们发现,在银行勉强超过分析师的盈利预测后,银行在第一季度收到的客户投诉平均增加了13.3%。这种影响主要是由于银行试图减少非利息支出,以超过盈利基准。当银行首席执行官获得更大比例的激励性薪酬时,这种关系就更强。总体而言,本文论证了资本市场激励如何加剧股东与客户之间的冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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