Divestiture: Doctrinal Development and Modern Application

Q2 Social Sciences
Daniel Lumer
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In the last several years, policymakers have increasingly pursued legislative reforms that would expand antitrust enforcement while advocating more generally for the break-up of tech companies with leading digital platforms. At least a half-dozen antitrust reforms were introduced in Congress in 2021, while federal enforcers in the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have taken an aggressive approach to enforcement under the Biden administration. These recent events have invited an assessment of the scope and limitations of divestiture, as policymakers and regulators consider the remedy’s viability under existing and prospective federal antitrust laws. To that end, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive account of the development of the doctrinal principles and application of divestiture, beginning with its origins as an equitable remedy and subsequent developments in response to legislative reforms. The paper then discusses divestiture’s primary use in the current regulatory landscape to redress violations under § 7 of the Clayton Act, followed by an examination of its historically limited application as a remedy to unilateral conduct. In its final substantive section, the paper then assesses the ongoing debate as to divestiture’s applicability to acquisitions of nascent competitors. Finally, the conclusion provides a summary of divestiture’s doctrinal principles and application, and the implications for how divestiture may be applied in the future.
Divestiture:理论发展与现代应用
在过去几年中,政策制定者越来越多地寻求立法改革,以扩大反垄断执法,同时更普遍地主张拆分拥有领先数字平台的科技公司。2021年,国会至少引入了六项反垄断改革,而在拜登政府的领导下,司法部和联邦贸易委员会的联邦执法人员采取了积极的执法措施。最近的这些事件促使人们对资产剥离的范围和局限性进行评估,因为政策制定者和监管机构正在考虑根据现有和未来的联邦反垄断法采取补救措施的可行性。为此,本文旨在全面介绍剥离的理论原则和应用的发展,从其作为一种公平补救措施的起源以及随后针对立法改革的发展开始。然后,本文讨论了剥离在当前监管环境中的主要用途,以纠正《克莱顿法案》第7条规定的违规行为,然后审查了其作为单方面行为补救措施的历史有限应用。在最后一个实质性部分,该文件评估了正在进行的关于剥离适用于收购新生竞争对手的辩论。最后,结论总结了资产剥离的理论原则和应用,以及对未来如何应用资产剥离的启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Antitrust Bulletin
Antitrust Bulletin Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
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