Models, languages and representations: philosophical reflections driven from a research on teaching and learning about cellular respiration

Abstract

Mental model construction is supposed to be a useful cognitive devise for learning. Beyond human capacity of constructing mental models, scientists construct complex explanations about phenomena, named scientific or theoretical models. In this work we revisit three vissions: the first one concern about the polisemic term “model”. Our proposal is to discriminate between “mental models” and “explicit models”, being the former those “imaginistic” ideas constructed in scientists’—o teachers—minds, and the latter those teaching devices expressed in different languages that tend to communicate any “scientific model”. From this point of view, the class is considered a place where teachers’ mental models should be learned by novice students by decoding their teaching devices which are expressed in different languages. Other proposal of this work claims to distinguish the term “representation” with respect to its artistical or instrumental origin, highlighting that they are types of teaching devices and that artistical representations are always analogies. Finally, data about the construction of freshmen’s wrong mental models related to the use of the analogy between the chemical combustion and the global process of cellular respiration from glucose is presented to reinforce previous epistemological reflections.