Environmental delegation versus sales delegation: a game-theoretic analysis

IF 2.2 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Environment and Development Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-20 DOI:10.1017/s1355770x23000025

D. Buccella, L. Fanti, L. Gori

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Abstract

Recently, in their 2019 paper, Poyago-Theotoky and Yong consider a managerial Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities and emission taxes and propose an explicit environmental incentive in a managerial compensation contract. The authors compare several exogenous equilibria emerging in the symmetric sub-games in which the owner offers either the environmental delegation contract or the standard sales delegation contract: abatement and social welfare (resp. emission taxes) under environmental delegation are higher (resp. lower) than under sales delegation. The present work extends their model using a game-theoretic approach to analyse the asymmetric sub-games, in which only one firm adopts the environmental contract, and adds the contract decision stage. Results show that the environmental contract never emerges as the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative managerial decision game. Indeed, if the green R&D technology is efficient, the sales contract emerges as the unique Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if the green R&D technology is inefficient, multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist (coordination game). Our findings offer direct policy implications.

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环境委托与销售委托的博弈分析

最近，Poyago-Theotoky和Yong在他们2019年的论文中考虑了具有污染外部性和排放税的管理古诺双寡头垄断，并在管理薪酬合同中提出了明确的环境激励。作者比较了对称子博弈中出现的几种外生均衡，其中所有者提供环境委托合同或标准销售委托合同:减排和社会福利。环境授权下的排放税更高。低于销售授权。本文运用博弈论的方法扩展了他们的模型，分析了只有一家企业采用环境契约的非对称子博弈，并增加了契约决策阶段。结果表明，环境契约不会作为非合作管理决策博弈的唯一子博弈完美纳什均衡出现。事实上，如果绿色研发技术是有效的，那么销售合同就会出现独特的帕累托无效率纳什均衡。反之，如果绿色研发技术是低效的，则存在纯策略下的多重纳什均衡(协调博弈)。我们的研究结果提供了直接的政策启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Environment and Development Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： Environment and Development Economics is positioned at the intersection of environmental, resource and development economics. The Editor and Associate Editors, supported by a distinguished panel of advisors from around the world, aim to encourage submissions from researchers in the field in both developed and developing countries. The Journal is divided into two main sections, Theory and Applications, which includes regular academic papers and Policy Options, which includes papers that may be of interest to the wider policy community. Environment and Development Economics also publishes occasional Policy Fora (discussions based on a focal paper). From time to time the journal publishes special issues based on a particular theme.