Private deposit insurance, deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard

IF 3.1 1区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Piotr Danisewicz , Chun Hei Lee , Klaus Schaeck
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.

私人存款保险、存款流动、银行贷款和道德风险
我们研究了在危机期间,私人无限存款保险作为联邦存款保险对存款流动、银行贷款和道德风险的补充所起的作用。我们发现,与存款只有联邦政府担保的银行相比,存款得到联邦政府和私人全面担保的银行获得了更多的存款,并扩大了放贷。我们还证明,在次贷危机期间,私人保险银行在贷款发放过程中保持谨慎。我们的研究结果提供了新颖的见解存款人和银行的行为,存在多种存款保险计划与不同的设计特点。它们还说明了私营部门的解决方案如何激励审慎的银行行为,以加强金融安全网。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
45
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Intermediation seeks to publish research in the broad areas of financial intermediation, financial market structure, corporate finance, risk management, and valuation.
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