Subject, Object, and Knowledge as First-Person

IF 0.3 N/A PHILOSOPHY
M. Antognazza
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one’s own modes of being; 2) individual human knowledge in its paradigmatic form is essentially first-personal, that is, its object-directedness requires a built-in, implicit awareness of a ‘self’ that provides the unifying perspective from which the aliud is apprehended; 3) this is a first-order awareness which is crucially distinct from the second-order awareness which requires a reflexive cognitive act – a distinction which the author proposes to cash out in terms of ‘first-person knowledge’ versus ‘self-knowledge.
作为第一人称的主体、客体和知识
本文试图表明,关注主体和客体为何以及如何区分,对于理解知识本身的本质至关重要。它认为:1)认知始于一种表象,这种表象以一种与人自身存在模式根本不同的方式呈现在被感知的自我面前;2)个体的人类知识在其范例形式中基本上是第一人称的,也就是说,它的对象定向性需要一种内在的、隐含的“自我”意识,这种意识提供了一个统一的视角,从这个视角来理解事物;3)这是一种一阶意识,它与需要反身性认知行为的二阶意识有着至关重要的区别——作者建议用“第一人称知识”和“自我知识”来区分这种区别。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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