{"title":"Traité des premières vérités by Claude G. Buffier (review)","authors":"Jeffrey D. Burson","doi":"10.1353/hph.2023.0011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"conclusively. To prove convincingly that the Dutch Cartesians served as the midwives to the birth of a philosophy of science, a significantly longer work would be needed—one that spends more time detailing philosophy’s relation to science not only in previous traditions but also in those outside the Dutch context in the same centuries. Strazzoni also makes far-reaching claims on the need for foundationalism; however, the book would have benefited from offering a more robust defense against possible counterexamples and objections. Strazzoni does point to Regius, who conspicuously leaves out much of Descartes’s metaphysics, as a powerful counterexample, but holds him to be both an exception and the catalyst driving the shift to foundational concerns. This might be seen as problematic in light of the book’s strongest claim: just how successful Strazzoni is in problematizing the very meaning of “foundation.” Throughout the book, we see ethics as the goal of a foundation, logic as a foundation, reliability as a gauge for foundations, metaphysics as foundational, and all manners of approaches to epistemic foundationalism, which leaves the reader wondering if there really is a consistent thread motivating these various thinkers or if there could be any common origin. We might also question what was unique in the Dutch context, as questions and debates over many of these themes also emerged in France, for example, where there were prominent Cartesians who disregarded foundational concerns, such as Jacques Rohault, and many others who were deeply engaged in them. While I have raised some criticisms, it is important to note that they are less about the substance of the book than they are about the packaging. Strazzoni’s book severely problematizes any assumptions one might have about a single kind of foundationalism as a consistent theme throughout Cartesianism, while also giving an excellent vantage point to assess the various ends that these six thinkers had in mind. His insight also presents a compelling narrative of the complex interrelations among Dutch Cartesians with too many novel observations to note here. A a r o n S p i n k Dartmouth College","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"61 1","pages":"156 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2023.0011","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
conclusively. To prove convincingly that the Dutch Cartesians served as the midwives to the birth of a philosophy of science, a significantly longer work would be needed—one that spends more time detailing philosophy’s relation to science not only in previous traditions but also in those outside the Dutch context in the same centuries. Strazzoni also makes far-reaching claims on the need for foundationalism; however, the book would have benefited from offering a more robust defense against possible counterexamples and objections. Strazzoni does point to Regius, who conspicuously leaves out much of Descartes’s metaphysics, as a powerful counterexample, but holds him to be both an exception and the catalyst driving the shift to foundational concerns. This might be seen as problematic in light of the book’s strongest claim: just how successful Strazzoni is in problematizing the very meaning of “foundation.” Throughout the book, we see ethics as the goal of a foundation, logic as a foundation, reliability as a gauge for foundations, metaphysics as foundational, and all manners of approaches to epistemic foundationalism, which leaves the reader wondering if there really is a consistent thread motivating these various thinkers or if there could be any common origin. We might also question what was unique in the Dutch context, as questions and debates over many of these themes also emerged in France, for example, where there were prominent Cartesians who disregarded foundational concerns, such as Jacques Rohault, and many others who were deeply engaged in them. While I have raised some criticisms, it is important to note that they are less about the substance of the book than they are about the packaging. Strazzoni’s book severely problematizes any assumptions one might have about a single kind of foundationalism as a consistent theme throughout Cartesianism, while also giving an excellent vantage point to assess the various ends that these six thinkers had in mind. His insight also presents a compelling narrative of the complex interrelations among Dutch Cartesians with too many novel observations to note here. A a r o n S p i n k Dartmouth College
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