Quality-efficiency trade-off when the state is the sole provider of hospital services: Evidence from New Zealand

IF 1.2 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Antony Andrews, Biresh K. Sahoo, Omphile Temoso, Sean Kimpton
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore the trade-off between technical efficiency and the quality of hospital services when the state is the sole provider. Data from 20 New Zealand District Health Boards from 2011 to 2017 is used to estimate technical efficiency using the data envelopment analysis technique, which employs an additive inverse formulation for undesirable outcomes. The estimated average quality-adjusted technical efficiency score is 0.69. In comparison, when the quality variable was removed, the efficiency declined to 0.66. More importantly, the ranking of district health boards stays consistent across both models, indicating that there is very little trade-off between quality and efficiency. A sensitivity analysis also confirms the lack of a trade-off between quality and efficiency.

国家是医院服务的唯一提供者时的质量-效率权衡:来自新西兰的证据
本研究的目的是探讨当国家是唯一提供者时,技术效率与医院服务质量之间的权衡关系。2011年至2017年新西兰20个地区卫生委员会的数据用于使用数据包络分析技术估计技术效率,该技术采用累加式逆公式来计算不良结果。估计质量调整后的平均技术效率得分为0.69。而去掉质量变量后,效率下降到0.66。更重要的是,两种模式的地区保健委员会的排名保持一致,表明质量和效率之间几乎没有取舍。敏感性分析也证实了在质量和效率之间缺乏权衡。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: Australian Economic Papers publishes innovative and thought provoking contributions that extend the frontiers of the subject, written by leading international economists in theoretical, empirical and policy economics. Australian Economic Papers is a forum for debate between theorists, econometricians and policy analysts and covers an exceptionally wide range of topics on all the major fields of economics as well as: theoretical and empirical industrial organisation, theoretical and empirical labour economics and, macro and micro policy analysis.
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