Preferences on financing mechanisms for thermal retrofit measures in multi-owner buildings: A discrete choice experiment with landlords and owner-occupiers in France

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Valeria Fanghella , Marie-Charlotte Guetlein , Joachim Schleich , Carine Sebi
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Abstract

Thermal retrofit of existing buildings is a major challenge for the energy transition. Retrofitting multi-owner buildings is particularly challenging because it involves multiple co-owners with heterogeneous preferences and incentives to renovate. We conduct a discrete choice experiment on thermal retrofit measures with landlords and owner-occupiers of condominiums in multi-owner buildings in France. Attributes include financing mechanisms (equity, private loan, and collective loan), transferability of loans (i.e. loans, which may be transferred to the next owner in case the condominium is sold), heating cost savings (absolute and relative to other co-owners in the same building), and investment costs. Results from estimating mixed logit models suggest that participants prefer on average equity financing over loan financing and collective loans over private loans. Aversion to loan financing appears to be partly due to debt aversion. The results also suggest that for loan financing, co-owners prefer transferable loans. Further, co-owners do not like retrofit measures that result in higher heating cost savings for other co-owners in the same building than for themselves. Thus, asymmetric distribution of benefits of thermal retrofit measures may impede acceptability of such measures in multi-owner buildings. Finally, the findings provide no evidence for a landlord-tenant split incentives problem in our sample.

对多业主建筑热改造措施融资机制的偏好:法国房东和自住业主的离散选择实验
现有建筑的热改造是能源转型的一大挑战。改造多业主建筑尤其具有挑战性,因为它涉及多个具有不同偏好和动机的共有业主。我们与法国多业主建筑中共管公寓的房东和自住业主进行了一项关于热改造措施的离散选择实验。属性包括融资机制(股权、私人贷款和集体贷款)、贷款的可转让性(即,如果公寓出售,贷款可能会转让给下一位业主)、供暖成本节约(相对于同一建筑中的其他共有人而言是绝对的)和投资成本。估计混合logit模型的结果表明,参与者平均更喜欢股权融资而不是贷款融资,集体贷款而不是私人贷款。对贷款融资的厌恶似乎部分是由于对债务的厌恶。研究结果还表明,对于贷款融资,共有人更喜欢可转让贷款。此外,共有人不喜欢为同一栋楼的其他共有人节省比自己更高的供暖成本的改造措施。因此,热改造措施的利益分配不对称可能会阻碍多业主建筑对此类措施的可接受性。最后,研究结果没有为我们的样本中的房东-租客分割激励问题提供证据。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.
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