{"title":"Debt maturity and firm productivity—The role of intangibles","authors":"Ryota Nakatani","doi":"10.1016/j.rie.2023.01.009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Does the maturity of debt matter for productivity? Using data on Italian firms from 1997 to 2015, we study the relationship among debt maturity, productivity, and firm characteristics. We find that productivity is positively associated with short-term debt and negatively associated with long-term debt. This result supports the hypothesis that the less intense monitoring of firm performance and fewer liquidation fears stemming from the long maturity of debt causes a moral hazard, while short-term debt serves as a disciplinary device to improve firm performance in the short run. This effect is evident in small- and medium-sized enterprises and old firms. In contrast, large firms can utilize long-term financing to improve productivity through long-term investments. Firms improve productivity by purchasing intangible assets financed by short-term debt.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46094,"journal":{"name":"Research in Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"Pages 116-121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944323000066","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Does the maturity of debt matter for productivity? Using data on Italian firms from 1997 to 2015, we study the relationship among debt maturity, productivity, and firm characteristics. We find that productivity is positively associated with short-term debt and negatively associated with long-term debt. This result supports the hypothesis that the less intense monitoring of firm performance and fewer liquidation fears stemming from the long maturity of debt causes a moral hazard, while short-term debt serves as a disciplinary device to improve firm performance in the short run. This effect is evident in small- and medium-sized enterprises and old firms. In contrast, large firms can utilize long-term financing to improve productivity through long-term investments. Firms improve productivity by purchasing intangible assets financed by short-term debt.
期刊介绍:
Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.