IV. ICT for Community Security

Abstract

Neighbourhood watch has yet to be implemented throughout Mogadishu’s districts, but Waberi’s experience shows how successful such schemes can be at mobilising communities and collecting the information and intelligence needed to make the district safer. Nevertheless, police– community relations remain marred by distrust, and the collecting of information, let alone of intelligence, remains a long-standing challenge in a clan-based culture in which family and clan come before crime reporting, and memories of Barre’s formidable policing system continue to influence attitudes. Waberi’s police station may be a place where residents can engage with officers, but most crime is not reported to the police, and even if it were, few expect the police to respond. Most victims turn first to elders or religious leaders. Little is known about the police force’s attempts to collect information and intelligence, although what exists is probably driven by the need for actionable intelligence on Al-Shabaab, rather than as an aspect of crime prevention or resource allocation. AMISOM and UNSOM provide relevant courses, while donors such as the UK and the US deliver training for criminal intelligence and forensic purposes, which officers say they value because it is proper policing in a way that community policing is not. But such training has limited application because Somali officers do not follow chains of evidence in the way that a European officer might. Indeed, anecdotal and circumstantial reports suggest that many have no understanding of why evidence should be collected. Also, the most valued forms of investigative training are reputedly aligned to the physical coercion style employed by NISA. And this has been true for some years. For example, 2012 saw the introduction of a cash-for-tips scheme that provided a reward of $500 dollars for information relating to the capture of Al-Shabaab leaders and $100 dollars for information on the