Loss aversion for the value of voting rights: WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2021.106041

Hiroharu Saito

{"title":"Loss aversion for the value of voting rights: WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot","authors":"Hiroharu Saito","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2021.106041","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>What is the subjective value of voting rights? This article presents an empirical demonstration of people’s loss aversion for the value of voting rights. By way of vignette experiments using scenarios of the 2020 U.S. presidential election (Studies 1 and 2, with U.S. citizens) and a fictitious direct premier election in Japan (Study 3, with Japanese citizens), the present research measured the willingness-to-accept compensation (WTA) and the willingness-to-pay price (WTP) for a ballot(s) in political elections. A great disparity between WTA and WTP was found regardless of the electoral setting, the proportion and width of ballot alteration, and the initial status. Specifically, the observed WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot(s) were within the range of 5.00–27.36, which is much larger than the ratios for ordinary market goods (about 1.5–2.5) and which is comparable to the ratios for other non-market goods. In addition, WTA for a mere 10% dilution of voting rights is still higher than WTP for full voting rights; the powerful effect of loss aversion might help explain universal barriers against suffrage extension.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"69 ","pages":"Article 106041"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014481882100065X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

What is the subjective value of voting rights? This article presents an empirical demonstration of people’s loss aversion for the value of voting rights. By way of vignette experiments using scenarios of the 2020 U.S. presidential election (Studies 1 and 2, with U.S. citizens) and a fictitious direct premier election in Japan (Study 3, with Japanese citizens), the present research measured the willingness-to-accept compensation (WTA) and the willingness-to-pay price (WTP) for a ballot(s) in political elections. A great disparity between WTA and WTP was found regardless of the electoral setting, the proportion and width of ballot alteration, and the initial status. Specifically, the observed WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot(s) were within the range of 5.00–27.36, which is much larger than the ratios for ordinary market goods (about 1.5–2.5) and which is comparable to the ratios for other non-market goods. In addition, WTA for a mere 10% dilution of voting rights is still higher than WTP for full voting rights; the powerful effect of loss aversion might help explain universal barriers against suffrage extension.

查看原文本刊更多论文

对投票权价值的损失厌恶:选票的WTA/WTP比率

投票权的主观价值是什么?本文实证证明了人们对投票权价值的损失厌恶。通过使用2020年美国总统选举(研究1和2，与美国公民)和虚构的日本直接总理选举(研究3，与日本公民)场景的小插图实验，本研究测量了政治选举中接受补偿的意愿(WTA)和支付价格的意愿(WTP)。无论选举设置、选票变更的比例和宽度，还是初始状态，WTA和WTP都存在很大的差异。具体而言，观察到的选票的WTA/WTP比率在5.00-27.36之间，这比普通市场商品的比率(约1.5-2.5)要大得多，也与其他非市场商品的比率相当。此外，WTA对仅10%投票权的稀释仍高于WTP对完全投票权的稀释;损失厌恶的强大效应或许有助于解释反对延长选举权的普遍障碍。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

International Review of Law and Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

18.20%

发文量

审稿时长

48 days

期刊介绍： The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.