Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism

IF 1.2 2区 哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS
C. Knight
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.
适可而止:对适可主义的过度反对
摘要充分主义的标准版本认为,为人们提供足够的或尽可能接近足够的东西,在词汇上优先于其他分配目标。这篇文章认为,这在四个不同的方面是过度的——超过了分配正义所允许的。这些问题涉及优势的大小、受益者的数量、责任和沙漠以及高于阈值的分布。作为回应,充足者可以接受无条件提供足够的资金超出了分配正义的允许范围,而不是平衡充足性与其他考虑因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
8.30%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.
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