Naturalism and Kantianism

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
V. Bazhanov
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

An article by T. Rockmore, published in the journal “Epistemology and Philosophy of Science” in 2009 (Vol. XXII. No. 4, pp. 14‒29), claim that naturalism is by its nature an example of anti-Kantianism, for it treats philosophy as a continuation science and recognizes science as a legitimate source of knowledge, does not allow a priori, relies on an a posteriori approach, empiricism in the pre-Kantian sense, and insists on the possibility of revising the knowledge acquired. This article has a goal to show that T. Rockmore point of view should be revised due to the progress of modern cognitive research and, first of all, neuroscience, in which all the features of the naturalistic approach are implemented and in which the “Kantian program” of brain research is developed. In the context of this program, the existence on the ontological level (i.e., in the brain) of certain neural structures that make it possible and play a crucial role in the cognitive activity of a person is recognized. Those concepts that Kant treated as components of cognitive activity in modern neuroscience acquired ontological status in the form of the activity of certain neural structures, which turn out to be prerequisites and components of this activity. We claim that in the context of the Kantian research program in neuroscience, the metaphor "Kantian brain" naturally entered the vocabulary of neuroscientists, and certain specific operations and functions of the brain began to be associated with individual elements of Kant's ideas. It is in this context attempts are made to comprehend the mechanisms of the brain in the "stimulus – activity" mode, when an external effect leads to the excitation of certain neural structures. The brain is capable to anticipate the long-term results of certain actions of the subject. In the case of foresight, the brain generates “internal” models and uses for their correction external data that constantly provided from reality across the subject. At the same time, some kind of self-correcting mechanisms implements, which from a formal point of view described by the Bayes theorem, using a priori evaluations of upcoming events and changes in these evaluations as result of experience. Thus, naturalism and Kantianism understood in the context of the progress of modern science, despite T. Rockmore idea, are completely compatible.
自然主义与康德主义
T.Rockmore在2009年发表在《科学的认识论与哲学》杂志上的一篇文章(第二十二卷第4期,第14-29页)声称,自然主义本质上是反康德主义的一个例子,因为它将哲学视为一门延续科学,并承认科学是知识的合法来源,不允许先验,依赖于后验方法,前康德意义上的经验主义,并坚持对所获得的知识进行修正的可能性。本文的目的是表明,由于现代认知研究的进步,以及首先是神经科学的进步,T.Rockmore的观点应该得到修正,在神经科学中,自然主义方法的所有特征都得到了实施,大脑研究的“康德程序”也在其中得到了发展。在这个程序的背景下,某些神经结构在本体论层面(即大脑中)的存在,使其成为可能,并在一个人的认知活动中发挥关键作用,这一点得到了认可。康德在现代神经科学中将这些概念视为认知活动的组成部分,这些概念以某些神经结构的活动形式获得了本体论地位,而这些结构是认知活动的先决条件和组成部分。我们声称,在神经科学中的康德研究计划的背景下,“康德大脑”这个隐喻自然地进入了神经科学家的词汇,大脑的某些特定操作和功能开始与康德思想的各个元素联系在一起。正是在这种情况下,当外部效应导致某些神经结构兴奋时,人们试图理解大脑在“刺激-活动”模式下的机制。大脑能够预测受试者某些行为的长期结果。在前瞻性的情况下,大脑会生成“内部”模型,并使用从整个主体的现实中不断提供的外部数据进行校正。同时,从贝叶斯定理描述的形式观点来看,使用对即将发生的事件的先验评估以及这些评估中作为经验结果的变化,实现了某种自校正机制。因此,在现代科学发展的背景下理解的自然主义和康德主义,尽管有罗克莫尔的思想,却是完全兼容的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
25.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Epistemology & Philosophy of Science is a quarterly peer-reviewed journal established in 2004 by the Institute of Philosophy (Russian Academy of Sciences). It is devoted to the themes in modern epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The journal supports the policy of interdisciplinarity. It’s based on the belief that the comprehensive analysis of cultural phenomena couldn’t be completed without focusing on the problems of cognition. The epistemological analysis, however, needs the research results from human, social and natural sciences. Sections of the journal: 1.Editorial 2.Panel Discussion 3.Epistemology and Cognition 4.Language and Mind 5.Vista 6.Case Studies -Science Studies 7.Interdisciplinary Studies 8.Archive 9.Symposium 10.Book Reviews
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