Transferable Exclusivity Vouchers and Incentives for Antimicrobial Development in the European Union

IF 1.6 4区哲学 Q2 ETHICS

Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics Pub Date : 2023-05-25 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.4396437

Victor Van de Wiele, A. Raymakers, A. Kesselheim, B. Rome

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The European Commission’s proposal to address antimicrobial resistance using transferable exclusivity vouchers (TEVs) is fundamentally flawed. European policymakers and regulators should consider alternatives, such as better funding for basic and clinical research, use of advance market commitments funded by a pay-or-play tax, or enacting an EU Fund for Antibiotic Development.

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欧盟抗菌剂开发的可转让独家代金券和激励措施

摘要欧盟委员会关于使用可转让排他性凭证（TEV）解决抗微生物耐药性的提议存在根本缺陷。欧洲政策制定者和监管机构应考虑其他选择，如为基础和临床研究提供更好的资金，使用由按需付费税资助的预先市场承诺，或设立欧盟抗生素开发基金。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 医学-医学：法

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

4.80%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Material published in The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (JLME) contributes to the educational mission of The American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, covering public health, health disparities, patient safety and quality of care, and biomedical science and research. It provides articles on such timely topics as health care quality and access, managed care, pain relief, genetics, child/maternal health, reproductive health, informed consent, assisted dying, ethics committees, HIV/AIDS, and public health. Symposium issues review significant policy developments, health law court decisions, and books.