Why, did I lose? Debriefing quality and its effects on justice, protests, and sales loss attributions

IF 6.8 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Timothy G. Hawkins , Mike Wittmann , Michael J. Gravier , Suman Niranjan , William A. Muir
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

When suppliers lose in a competitive tender process, they need feedback to make accurate sales loss attributions and adjustments to their competitive strategy. Unfortunately, buyers seldomly provide sufficient feedback to enable diagnostics, learning, and adaptation. The purpose of this research is to explore a buyer's debriefing as an effective feedback mechanism. Based on data from a sample of 218 U.S. government source selections, a new construct, debriefing quality, is developed as a multi-dimensional construct comprised of: proposal efficacy information, procedural compliance and decision understanding information, and competitive intelligence information. Results show that debriefing quality enhances procedural justice and internal and external attributions and reduces supplier opportunism and perceptions of buyer opportunism. Further, the underlying procedural justice of the source selection deters bid protests, and debriefing quality can impact perceptions of procedural justice. Importantly, debriefing quality is essential in the assignment of loss attributions to strategy, thus affecting strategy change. These findings expand attribution theory by identifying new external attributions particular to a business-to-business context, namely suspicion of buyer opportunism and procedural justice. The study closes with specific information buyers can provide to suppliers to mitigate bid protests and help suppliers learn from the tender enabling future strategy improvements.

为什么,我输了?汇报质量及其对司法、抗议和销售损失归因的影响
当供应商在竞争性招标过程中出现损失时,他们需要反馈来准确地进行销售损失归因并调整竞争策略。不幸的是,购买者很少提供足够的反馈来进行诊断、学习和适应。本研究的目的是探讨买方述职作为一种有效的反馈机制。基于218个美国政府信息源选择样本的数据,本文开发了一个新的结构——汇报质量,作为一个多维结构,包括:提案有效性信息、程序遵从性和决策理解信息以及竞争情报信息。结果表明,汇报质量提高了程序公正和内外部归因,减少了供应商机会主义和买方机会主义的感知。此外,资源选择的潜在程序正义阻止了投标抗议,汇报质量可以影响对程序正义的看法。重要的是,汇报质量在战略损失归因分配中至关重要,从而影响战略变更。这些发现扩展了归因理论,确定了新的外部归因,特别是在企业对企业的背景下,即怀疑买家机会主义和程序正义。该研究最后提供了买方可以向供应商提供的具体信息,以减轻投标抗议,并帮助供应商从投标中学习,从而实现未来战略的改进。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
18.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management is to publish original, high-quality research within the field of purchasing and supply management (PSM). Articles should have a significant impact on PSM theory and practice. The Journal ensures that high quality research is collected and disseminated widely to both academics and practitioners, and provides a forum for debate. It covers all subjects relating to the purchase and supply of goods and services in industry, commerce, local, national, and regional government, health and transportation.
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