Uncertainty, Possibility, and Causal Power in QCA

Abstract

Uncertainty undermines causal claims; however, the nature of causal claims decides what counts as relevant uncertainty. Empirical robustness is imperative in regularity theories of causality. Regularity theory features strongly in QCA, making its case sensitivity a weakness. Following qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) founder Charles Ragin’s emphasis on ontological realism, this article suggests causality as a power and thus breaks with the ontological determinism of regularity theories. Exercising causal powers makes it possible for human agents to achieve an outcome but does not determine that they will. The article explains how QCA’s truth table analysis “models” possibilistic uncertainty and how crisp sets do this better than fuzzy sets. Causal power is at the heart of critical realist philosophy of science. Like Ragin, critical realism suggests empirical analysis as merely describing underlying causal relationships. Empirical statements must be substantively interpreted into causal claims. The article is critical of “empiricist” QCA that infers causality from the robustness of set relationships.