Environmental incentives facing private information

IF 2.2 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Environment and Development Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-22 DOI:10.1017/S1355770X21000048

F. Wirl

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Environmental incentives are characterized by two distinct features: (1) a benefit-cost trade-off; and (2) private information about the trade-off. This suggests a degree of freedom of where to attach the private information, either to the benefit or the costs, as long as these choices imply the same behavior absent incentives (‘observation equivalent’). However, we show that different observation equivalent specifications can lead to different incentives. This is demonstrated for two cases: rainforest protection and contributions to a public good. Therefore, the choice of a private information parameter must be justified against observation equivalent alternatives.

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私人信息面临的环境激励

摘要环境激励具有两个明显的特征：（1）利益成本权衡；以及（2）关于权衡的私人信息。这表明，只要这些选择在没有激励的情况下意味着相同的行为（“观察等效”），就可以在一定程度上自由地将私人信息附加到哪里，无论是利益还是成本。然而，我们表明，不同的观测等效规范可以导致不同的激励。这在两个案例中得到了证明：雨林保护和对公共利益的贡献。因此，私人信息参数的选择必须与观测等效的备选方案相比较。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Environment and Development Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： Environment and Development Economics is positioned at the intersection of environmental, resource and development economics. The Editor and Associate Editors, supported by a distinguished panel of advisors from around the world, aim to encourage submissions from researchers in the field in both developed and developing countries. The Journal is divided into two main sections, Theory and Applications, which includes regular academic papers and Policy Options, which includes papers that may be of interest to the wider policy community. Environment and Development Economics also publishes occasional Policy Fora (discussions based on a focal paper). From time to time the journal publishes special issues based on a particular theme.