Heidegger on Being Self-Concealing by Katherine Withy (Oxford University Press, 2022). ISBN 9780192859846

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
T. Keiling
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Unless one were to doubt that we know anything at all, we have knowledge of things, and these things exist. Arguably, the first move of idealism in philosophy is to take as paradigmatic this kind of overlap between what we know and what there is. It triggers an enquiry into what it means to know something and what that something, or anything, really,must be like for us to know it. In both epistemology and ontology, asking these sorts of questions is the approach of transcendental philosophy. In Kant’s formulation, we ask for the ‘conditions of possibility of the objects of experience’, of those things that exist and that we know. But things may go wrong, or stall. What if I presume that something exists, like the solution to a problem or the cause of something I see happening – but I cannot bring them clearly into view? In these cases, we know that there is something to be known, but don’t know how; we reach a limit of knowledge. Andwhat about the casewhere something completely unexpected happens? Here, something comes into being from beyond the limits of what we can know. But expected or not, once it is here, it no doubt exists, calling into question the notion that being and knowing are in principle co-extensive. The Kantian idealist’s response to these kinds of cases is that they don’t really matter. What counts is the good case, where cognition succeeds. Especially its very opposite, the case of something we don’t know and can’t even anticipate – why care? And how could we even think about that? Kate Withy’s book on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger shows that he did care, and it makes a good case that we should, too. The argument Withy sees Heidegger pursuing is a variation on the transcendental line of questioning, but with a crucial shift from clear success at knowing to limit cases. In fact, Heidegger takes these cases to provide an answer to the ontological question: for something to exist means for it to be, to some extent or in some respect, inaccessible to us. It is precisely the fact that things,
凯瑟琳·威伊的《海德格尔论自我隐藏》(牛津大学出版社,2022)。ISBN 9780192859846
除非有人怀疑我们知道任何事情,否则我们对事物有了解,而这些事物是存在的。可以说,哲学中唯心主义的第一步是将我们所知道的和所存在的之间的这种重叠作为典范。它引发了对了解某事意味着什么以及了解某事或任何事情对我们来说必须是什么样子的探究。在认识论和本体论中,提出这类问题都是先验哲学的方法。在康德的表述中,我们要求“经验对象的可能性条件”,那些存在的和我们知道的东西。但事情可能会出问题,或者停滞不前。如果我假设某件事存在,比如问题的解决方案或我看到的事情发生的原因,但我不能清楚地看到它们,该怎么办?在这些情况下,我们知道有一些事情需要知道,但不知道如何知道;我们达到了知识的极限。如果发生了完全出乎意料的事情呢?在这里,有些东西是从我们所能知道的范围之外产生的。但无论预期与否,一旦它来到这里,它无疑是存在的,这让人对存在和知道原则上是共同广泛的这一概念产生了质疑。康德唯心主义者对这类案例的反应是,它们其实并不重要。重要的是好的案例,在那里认知是成功的。尤其是它的反面,我们不知道甚至无法预料的事情——为什么要在乎?我们怎么能想到这一点呢?Kate Withy关于Martin Heidegger哲学的书表明,他确实很关心,这也很好地证明了我们也应该关心。威西认为海德格尔所追求的论点是超越性质疑路线的变体,但从明确的成功认识到限制案例,这是一个关键的转变。事实上,海德格尔用这些案例来回答本体论问题:事物的存在意味着它在某种程度上或在某种方面是我们无法接近的,
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.
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