{"title":"Extending the market theory of corporate political activity","authors":"Michael Greiner , Jaegul Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.lrp.2023.102305","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Scholars studying corporate political activity (CPA) have developed a market theory that has been widely accepted. This theory's ability to predict performance, however, has been equivocal. We argue that the predictability of the market theory for CPA could improve by accounting for three kinds of constraints that limit the possible actions of the politicians, the businesses, and other interested parties as they engage in CPA. These three constraints are the politician's ideology, the nature of his or her financial contributions, and the political trends among his or her constituents. All actors are limited by these constraints, but they also could impact them. We test our hypotheses upon a unique dataset and find support for our hypotheses. We argue that using this approach to understand the pressures facing the actors involved in CPA could help scholars find a more predictable link between CPA and firm performance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":18141,"journal":{"name":"Long Range Planning","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Long Range Planning","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0024630123000122","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Scholars studying corporate political activity (CPA) have developed a market theory that has been widely accepted. This theory's ability to predict performance, however, has been equivocal. We argue that the predictability of the market theory for CPA could improve by accounting for three kinds of constraints that limit the possible actions of the politicians, the businesses, and other interested parties as they engage in CPA. These three constraints are the politician's ideology, the nature of his or her financial contributions, and the political trends among his or her constituents. All actors are limited by these constraints, but they also could impact them. We test our hypotheses upon a unique dataset and find support for our hypotheses. We argue that using this approach to understand the pressures facing the actors involved in CPA could help scholars find a more predictable link between CPA and firm performance.
期刊介绍:
Long Range Planning (LRP) is an internationally renowned journal specializing in the field of strategic management. Since its establishment in 1968, the journal has consistently published original research, garnering a strong reputation among academics. LRP actively encourages the submission of articles that involve empirical research and theoretical perspectives, including studies that provide critical assessments and analysis of the current state of knowledge in crucial strategic areas. The primary user base of LRP primarily comprises individuals from academic backgrounds, with the journal playing a dual role within this community. Firstly, it serves as a platform for the dissemination of research findings among academic researchers. Secondly, it serves as a channel for the transmission of ideas that can be effectively utilized in educational settings. The articles published in LRP cater to a diverse audience, including practicing managers and students in professional programs. While some articles may focus on practical applications, others may primarily target academic researchers. LRP adopts an inclusive approach to empirical research, accepting studies that draw on various methodologies such as primary survey data, archival data, case studies, and recognized approaches to data collection.