{"title":"Truth and consequences","authors":"Polly Mitchell, Alan Cribb, Vikki Entwistle","doi":"10.1111/meta.12644","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"54 4","pages":"523-538"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12644","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"METAPHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12644","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.
在1987年的论文《真理还是后果》(Truth or Consequences)中,丹·布洛克(Dan Brock)描述了哲学学术与公共政策制定的目标和美德之间的深刻冲突:前者关注的是寻求真理,后者必须主要关注促进好的结果。他认为,当哲学家参与决策时,他们必须将首要目标从真理转向结果——但这既有道德上的代价,也有方法论上的代价。布洛克的观点体现了对应用哲学可能的形态和本质的悲观看法,但这种看法并不罕见。本文描绘了一幅更丰富、更乐观的图景。它认为,理论哲学和应用哲学之间的区别不能最好地理解为真理与结果之间的选择。相反,应用哲学家从事的是与结果——包括哲学实践本身的结果——密切相关的各种形式的真理寻求。
期刊介绍:
Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.