{"title":"Outcome-based contracting and gaming practices in marketised public employment services. Dilemmas from the Italian case","authors":"G. Scarano","doi":"10.1017/s0047279422001003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Concerns about the unintended effects of marketised public employment services are increasingly expressed because there is mounting evidence that such services are frequently characterised by various gaming practices on the part of their providers. To prevent these unintended consequences, payment-by-result approaches have been progressively strengthened.\n The aim of the research reported in this article was to investigate the extent to which such approaches are able to make service providers accountable for client outcomes. The study used two Italian regional cases in order to compare different and alternative contracting arrangements: Lombardy (outcome-based payments), and Emilia-Romagna (fixed payments). Drawing on rich administrative databases, the analysis relied on a quantitative methodology based on propensity score matching and logistic regressions. Even if outcome-based contracting can make service providers financially accountable for the service outcome, the results of the analysis show that it does not sufficiently prevent gaming practices, resulting in inequity among the services provided.","PeriodicalId":51438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Social Policy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0047279422001003","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Concerns about the unintended effects of marketised public employment services are increasingly expressed because there is mounting evidence that such services are frequently characterised by various gaming practices on the part of their providers. To prevent these unintended consequences, payment-by-result approaches have been progressively strengthened.
The aim of the research reported in this article was to investigate the extent to which such approaches are able to make service providers accountable for client outcomes. The study used two Italian regional cases in order to compare different and alternative contracting arrangements: Lombardy (outcome-based payments), and Emilia-Romagna (fixed payments). Drawing on rich administrative databases, the analysis relied on a quantitative methodology based on propensity score matching and logistic regressions. Even if outcome-based contracting can make service providers financially accountable for the service outcome, the results of the analysis show that it does not sufficiently prevent gaming practices, resulting in inequity among the services provided.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Social Policy carries high quality articles on all aspects of social policy in an international context. It places particular emphasis upon articles which seek to contribute to debates on the future direction of social policy, to present new empirical data, to advance theories, or to analyse issues in the making and implementation of social policies. The Journal of Social Policy is part of the "Social Policy Package", which also includes Social Policy and Society and the Social Policy Digest. An online resource, the Social Policy Digest, was launched in 2003. The Digest provides a regularly up-dated, fully searchable, summary of policy developments and research findings across the whole range of social policy.