Essentialist Non-Reductivism

IF 1.4 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Taylor-Grey Miller
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

According to many contemporary metaphysicians, we ought to theorize in terms of grounding because of its promise to explicate the idea of reality having a layered structure. However, a tension emerges when one combines the layered structure view with the view that higher-level facts are not reducible to lower level facts. This tension emerges from two problems. The first problem arises from the fact that grounding explanations entail true universal generalizations. In order to satisfy this constraint, we will face serious pressure to make sure the entities involved in the grounded facts are appropriately connected to the entities involved in the grounding facts, otherwise the generalizations associated with those grounding claims will come out false. However, ensuring the appropriate connections seemingly leaves no way for the non-reductivist to fully squeeze out reference to higher-level entities as we descend the levels of ground. This threatens the result that some higher-level facts must be taken as fundamental, which the non-reductivist cannot accept. I’ll argue that we can resolve the tension by taking the connections at issue to be essentially true. We can call this view essentialist non-reductivism. One significant upshot of the argument is that we can see not only that essentialist non-reductivism successfully resolves the tension, but that in principle no better solution could be offered.
实在说Non-Reductivism
根据许多当代形而上学家的观点,我们应该从基础的角度进行理论化,因为它有望解释现实具有分层结构的概念。然而,当人们将分层结构观点与更高层次的事实不能简化为更低层次的事实的观点结合起来时,矛盾就出现了。这种紧张源于两个问题。第一个问题源于这样一个事实,即基础解释需要真正的普遍概括。为了满足这一约束,我们将面临巨大的压力,必须确保基础事实中涉及的实体与基础事实中涉及的实体有适当的联系,否则与这些基础主张相关的概括就会出现错误。然而,确保适当的联系似乎没有办法让非还原主义者在我们下降地面层次时完全挤出对更高层次实体的引用。这就威胁到必须把某些更高层次的事实当作根本的结果,而这是非还原论者不能接受的。我想说的是,我们可以通过让有争议的联系本质上为真来解决这种矛盾。我们可以称这种观点为本质主义非还原论。这个论点的一个重要结论是,我们不仅可以看到本质主义的非还原论成功地解决了这种紧张关系,而且原则上也没有更好的解决方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Philosophers' Imprint
Philosophers' Imprint PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
审稿时长
20 weeks
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