IV. The Fragile Decoupling of Regional Power Plays

Abstract

While the current intensification of Gulf–Asian relations shows an evolution over the last decade from mere trade exchanges to nascent security cooperation, the eventual outcome of this rapprochement remains uncertain. As the details of these ties mentioned in previous chapters indicate, the hedging approach of Gulf and Asian powers comes from a cautious position. Decision-makers on both sides have ensured that they do not challenge pre-existing security arrangements, nor do they explicitly target one country. They have refrained from interfering in the issues of the Gulf or the Asian security complexes, in order not to choose one side over the other. In other words, Gulf and Asian powers have tried to build a strategic framework to their relations without being trapped in the classic zero-sum game of alliances. But hedging without balancing or antagonising is a delicate game that can create confusion, requiring an ability to decouple cooperation with one state from the local power plays in which this state may be involved. This might work on an occasional basis and with a limited scope, but in the long term, strategic relations will inevitably reshape regional security complexes and induce realignments that neither Gulf states nor Asian states seem willing to trigger themselves. This is why there remain some unknowns at the core of new Gulf–Asia geopolitics. This chapter explores three specific conundrums Gulf and Asian countries may face in the near future, each of which would confront them with critical choices. The first case is India’s ‘Look West’ policy with the Arabian Peninsula, and how it will eventually put into question Gulf historical relations with Pakistan. The second case is Iran–Asia relations. Despite the intensification of their relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries such as China and India continue to cooperate with Iran in several fields, including energy security and the naval domain. Given the current level of enmity between Tehran and the GCC, any development on Asian–Gulf strategic cooperation will call for a clarification. The third unknown relates to the