A Uniform Hermeneutic Thesis

Abstract

At a broad level of generality, the orthodox approach to interpreting contracts, trusts, wills, security documents, company constitutions and so forth is the same: a search for the objective meaning to be attributed to the author or authors of the instrument (the ‘uniform hermeneutic thesis’). This article has two primary objectives. The first is to respond to a common criticism of this uniform objective approach. The criticism is that, as each species of legal obligation is different, different rules of interpretation should apply when the given legal context changes. For example, why not ask the settlor of an inter vivos trust what she meant to say when an interpretational dispute arises? The second reason is to demonstrate that the explanations most commonly given in defence of an objective approach to interpretation, namely to promote legal certainty and economic efficiency, fail to capture the essential reason why the objective approach permeates the general law. The thesis put forward in this article is that an objective theory of interpretation is a justifiable aspect of private law because language (being a form of communication) does not operate unilaterally, but rather requires stable and dependable shared conventions. This argument is supported by the further claim that, where the author of a legal instrument utilises these publicly recognised conventions in order to affect her or his legal relations with others, she or he ought to be bound by those conventions. One cannot have the benefit of ‘conventions for me but not for thee’.