Managerial labor mobility and banks’ financial reporting quality

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Saeyeon Oh, Kwangwoo Park
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between managers’ labor mobility and the financial reporting quality of banks. Using the state-level adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) as an exogenous shock discouraging labor mobility, we show that adoption of the IDD is associated with a decline in financial reporting quality, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions. The effect is larger for banks with managers who have limited outside job opportunities and smaller for banks with tight regulatory oversight. Our results support the view from the career concern hypothesis that bank managers facing restrictions on mobility have greater incentives to engage in discretionary accounting.

管理层劳动力流动性与银行财务报告质量
本文探讨了管理人员劳动力流动性与银行财务报告质量之间的关系。采用州一级采用的不可避免披露原则(IDD)作为抑制劳动力流动的外生冲击,我们表明,采用IDD与财务报告质量的下降有关,以可自由支配的贷款损失拨备衡量。对于管理人员外部就业机会有限的银行,这种影响更大,而对于监管严格的银行,这种影响较小。我们的研究结果支持职业关注假说的观点,即面临流动性限制的银行经理有更大的动机从事自由裁量会计。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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