Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions*

IF 11.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
M. Backus, Thomas Blake, B. Larsen, S. Tadelis
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引用次数: 37

Abstract

We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich, new dataset describing over 88 million listings from eBay's Best Offer platform, with back-and-forth bargaining occurring in over 25 million of these listings. We document patterns of behavior and relate them to "rational" and "psychological" theories of bargaining and find that bargaining patterns are consistent with elements of both approaches. Most notably, players with more bargaining strength typically receive better outcomes, and players exhibit equitable behavior by making offers that split-the-difference between negotiating positions. We are publicly releasing this new dataset to support additional empirical bargaining research.
现场顺序议价:来自数百万在线议价互动的证据*
我们使用一个丰富的新数据集来研究双边讨价还价情况下的行为模式,该数据集描述了eBay Best Offer平台上超过8800万件物品,其中超过2500万件物品中发生了来回讨价还价。我们记录了行为模式,并将其与议价的“理性”和“心理”理论联系起来,发现议价模式与两种方法的要素是一致的。最值得注意的是,具有更强议价能力的玩家通常会获得更好的结果,并且玩家通过在谈判立场之间提供折中方案而表现出公平的行为。我们公开发布这个新数据集,以支持额外的实证议价研究。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
24.20
自引率
2.20%
发文量
42
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Economics stands as the oldest professional journal of economics in the English language. Published under the editorial guidance of Harvard University's Department of Economics, it comprehensively covers all aspects of the field. Esteemed by professional and academic economists as well as students worldwide, QJE holds unparalleled value in the economic discourse.
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