Optimal federal co-regulation of renewable energy deployment

IF 2.6 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Jan-Niklas Meier , Paul Lehmann
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

In federally organized countries the allocation of renewable energy (RE) deployment is regulated by national and subnational governments. We analyze the efficiency of this federal co-regulation when different types of policy instruments – price and quantity – are applied at different government levels. Using an analytical model with two government levels, we show that efficient federal co-regulation crucially depends on the burden sharing of national subsidy costs among subnational jurisdictions. We find that national price-based regulation, i.e. feed-in tariff, is efficient if burden shares of subnational jurisdictions are distributed in proportion to their population. This holds regardless of the policy instrument applied at the subnational level as long as RE deployment causes regional costs instead of regional benefits. Under national quantity-based regulation, i.e. tenders, efficient burden sharing depends on the policy instrument applied at the subnational level. Subnational price-based regulation, e.g. state-level levies, combined with national quantity-based regulation requires burden shares to be oriented towards first-best RE deployment shares. By contrast, subnational quantity-based regulation, i.e. spatial planning, combined with national quantity-based regulation, under certain conditions, requires population-oriented burden sharing, namely, if RE deployment only causes negative regional effects. If so, we also show that national quantity-based regulation ends up to be de-facto price-based.

可再生能源部署的最佳联邦共同监管
在联邦制国家,可再生能源(RE)部署的分配由国家和地方政府监管。我们分析了当不同类型的政策工具——价格和数量——在不同的政府层面应用时,这种联邦共同监管的效率。通过使用两个政府级别的分析模型,我们发现有效的联邦共同监管在很大程度上取决于国家补贴成本在次国家管辖范围内的负担分担。我们发现,如果地方司法管辖区的负担份额按人口比例分配,国家基于价格的监管(即上网电价)是有效的。只要可再生能源的部署造成区域成本而不是区域效益,无论在国家以下一级采用何种政策工具,情况都是如此。根据以数量为基础的国家监管,即招标,有效的负担分担取决于在国家以下一级采用的政策工具。次国家价格监管,例如州级征税,结合国家数量监管,要求负担分担面向最佳可再生能源部署份额。相比之下,地方数量调控,即空间规划与国家数量调控相结合,在一定条件下,需要以人口为导向的负担分担,即如果可再生能源的部署只会产生负面的区域效应。如果是这样,我们还表明,以数量为基础的国家监管最终实际上是以价格为基础的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.
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