Alethic Rights and Alethic Pluralism in Libraries

IF 0.8 4区 管理学 Q3 INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE
Riccardo Ridi
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Abstract

Abstract The concept of truth, although unavoidable, is very problematic from a philosophical point of view and, in the field of librarianship, it is even more disputed for various reasons: inapplicability to libraries’ collections and reference services; scarcity of resources necessary in the event of a possible application; conflict with the value of intellectual neutrality. The “alethic rights” proposed by D’Agostini in 2017, pertinent to truth claims in social contexts, can be interpreted in two ways: the “strong” way is not applicable to libraries because it would lead to the same problems caused by the research of the truthfulness of each document preserved by libraries and of any information provided by their reference services; the “weak” way would instead be applicable to libraries, but it is more appropriate not to apply this either, both because there would be the risk that it could be interpreted in the strong way, and because its application would still be redundant compared to what already happens in libraries and to what, if necessary, could be obtained in emergency situations by applying instead the principle of social responsibility. In the library field it would be more sensible and useful to apply, instead of alethic rights, the epistemological theory of “alethic pluralism” by Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press and Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Clarendon, which defines the concept of truth in a way compatible with technical practices and with deontological rules currently more widespread in libraries.
Alethic权利与图书馆的Alethic多元主义
摘要真理的概念虽然不可避免,但从哲学的角度来看是非常有问题的,在图书馆学领域,由于各种原因,它更具争议性:不适用于图书馆的收藏和参考服务;可能申请时所需资源的稀缺性;与知识中立的价值观相冲突。达戈斯蒂尼在2017年提出的与社会背景下的真实性主张相关的“整体权利”可以用两种方式来解释:“强有力”的方式不适用于图书馆,因为它会导致对图书馆保存的每一份文件及其参考服务提供的任何信息的真实性进行研究所引起的同样问题;相反,“弱”方式将适用于库,但也不应用它更合适,因为它可能会被以强方式解释,而且与库中已经发生的情况相比,它的应用仍然是多余的,如果必要的话,可以在紧急情况下通过应用社会责任原则来获得。在图书馆领域,应用Wright(1992)的“整体多元主义”认识论理论,而不是单一权利,将是更明智和有用的。真理与客观性。剑桥:哈佛大学出版社和林奇出版社(2009)。真理是一体的。牛津:Clarendon,它以一种与技术实践和义务生物学规则兼容的方式定义了真理的概念,目前在图书馆中更为普遍。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: Libri, International Journal of Libraries and Information Services, investigates the functions of libraries and information services from both a historical and present-day perspective and analyses the role of information in cultural, organizational, national and international developments. The periodical reports on current trends in librarianship worldwide and describes the transformation of libraries and information services resulting from the introduction of new information technologies and working methods. Background information and the latest research findings in librarianship and information science are made accessible to experts and a broader public. Articles are in English and conform to the highest academic standards.
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